

# Feasibility Study on the establishment of a European Civil Peace Corps (ECPC)



## *Final Report*

**29 November 2005**

Pierre Robert (Channel Research)  
Knud Vilby (Cowi)  
Luca Aiolfi (B&S Europe)  
Ralf Otto (Channel Research)



channelresearch

19 Rue de l'Église St. Etienne 1380 Ohain Belgium  
Tel +32 2 633 65 29 Fax +32 2 633 30 92  
[www.channelresearch.com](http://www.channelresearch.com) [info@channelresearch.com](mailto:info@channelresearch.com)  
VAT No 864 560 703

## Table of Contents

<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>1. Introduction</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>2. Methodology</b>	<b>6</b>
2.1 Consulted and interviewed organisations	7
2.2 Field Trips	7
<b>3. Terminology</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>4. The idea of ECPC - The background and the vision</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>5. Existing structures for European civilian recruitment</b>	<b>14</b>
5.1 Overview	14
5.2 National and NGO- recruitment systems	15
5.3 European networks and platforms	19
5.4 Conclusions	19
<b>6. Specific lessons and experiences from other organisations</b>	<b>21</b>
6.1 Recruitment	21
6.2 Benefits and entitlements	26
6.3 Training	30
6.4 Mission support	31
6.5 Local ownership and local partners	33
6.6 Budget and range	33
6.7 Possible cooperation with ECPC	34
6.8 Other experiences and examples	35
6.9 Conclusions	36
<b>7. Other EU volunteer concepts/recruitment mechanisms and possible links to ECPC</b>	<b>38</b>
7.1 European Voluntary Service-EVS	38
7.2 European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps - EVHAC	42
7.3 Individual Experts Roster	43
7.4 Election Observer Roster	46
7.5 Relex Contract Agents	48
7.6 Junior Experts in Delegation Programme-JED Programme	51
<b>8. Profile of volunteers and the nature and duration of assignments</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>9. Potential recruitment models for ECPC</b>	<b>56</b>
9.1 Expanded government recruitment systems	56
9.2 Specialised Civil Society systems for recruitment of peace workers	56
9.3 Common Volunteer sending organisations (VSO's)	57
9.4 Potential recruitment models in new Member States	57
9.5 Recruitment on commercial terms	58
9.6 A combination of different models	58
<b>10. To set up the management of ECPC</b>	<b>60</b>
10.1 Decentralized Structure	60
10.2 Central management unit	61
10.3 Management functions	61
10.4 Costs to be considered	63
10.5 Conclusion	65
<b>11. Requests for ECPC - The identification of needs</b>	<b>66</b>

<b>12. Training</b>	<b>68</b>
12.1 Training needs for civil crisis management	68
12.2 Existing EU training in civil crisis management	68
12.3 Missing link of training and recruitment	70
12.4 Conclusions	71
<b>13. ECPC in the African context</b>	<b>72</b>
13.1 African initiatives	72
13.2 Cooperation between African organisations and ECPC	72
13.4 Donor programmes	74
13.5 Current demands in Sudan	74
13.6 Conclusions	75
<b>14. European NGO-views on ECPC</b>	<b>76</b>
14.1 Positive attitudes	76
14.2 Sceptical attitudes	76
<b>15. Conclusions and Recommendations</b>	<b>78</b>
15.1 General conclusions	78
15.2 Specific conclusions and recommendations	79

## Annexes

1. Terms of Reference
2. Aide Mémoire
3. Bibliography
4. List of organisations and persons met
5. Chart including ECPC's position in present EU instruments
6. Selected examples of volunteer organisations and recruitment agencies

## Abbreviations

APFO	Africa Peace Forum
ASPR	Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution
AU	African Union
CDC	Citizens Development Corps
CEELI	Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative
CEOS	Conditions of employment of other servants of the European Communities
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CS	Coordination Sud
CV	Curriculum Vitae
DED	Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst (German Development Service)
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DG	Directorate General
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DSA	Daily Subsistence Allowance
EAP	Emergency Action Plan
EC	European Community
ECMM	European Community Monitoring Mission
ECOWAS	Economic Community Of West African States
ECPC	European Civil Peace Corps
EIDHR	European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
ENCPS	European Network for Civil Peace Services
EOM	Election Observation Mission
EP	European Parliament
EPLO	European Peace building Liaison Office
EPSO	European Personnel Selection Office
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EVHAC	European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps
EVS	European Voluntary Service
FPA	Framework Partnership Agreement
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Cooperation)
HIV/Aids	Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired immuno-deficiency syndrome
HQ	Headquarters
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IESC	International Executive Service Corp
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Developments
IHB	International Humanitarian Service
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
ISIS	International Security Information Service
IT	Information Technology
JED	Junior Experts in Delegations
JPO	Junior Professional Officer
LTO	Long-Term Observer
MBAEC	MBA Enterprise Corps
MEP	Member of European Parliament
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MLA	Monthly Living Allowance
MS	Danish Association for International Cooperation
MSF	Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors without borders)
NCHR	Norwegian Centre for Human Rights
NEAG	Netherlands Expertise Centre Alternative to Violence
NGO	Non governmental organisation

NOK	Norwegian Krone
NORDEM	Norsk ressursbank for demokrati og menneskerettigheter (Norwegian Resource Bank for Democratization and Human Rights)
OAS	Organization of American States
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAH	Polish Humanitarian Organisation
PBI	Peace Brigades International
PCM	Project Cycle Management
PST	Pre-service training
REACT	Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams
RRM	Rapid Reaction Mechanism of the EU
RSA	Resettlement Allowance
SIGPLUS	Settling-In-Grant Plus
STO	Short-Term Observer
ToR	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCIVPOL	United Nations Civilian Police
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNV	United Nations Volunteers
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VfP	Volunteers for Prosperity
VIA	Volontaires Internationaux Administratifs
VLA	Volunteer Living Allowance
VSO	Voluntary Services Overseas
WACSOFF	West African Civil Society Forum
ZFD	Programme Ziviler Friedensdienst (Civil Peace Service)
ZIF	Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (Centre for International Peace Operations)

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

This study, requested by the EU Commission, assesses the feasibility of the establishment of a European Civil Peace Corps (ECPC). The study was conducted during April - December 2005.

### **Objective and focus**

This study's objective is to "provide the services of the European Commission with an analysis of the feasibility of the establishment of an ECPC." The report focuses on the feasibility of ECPC for pre- and post-conflict activities, not traditional development activities. In addition, the study assumes that the profile of volunteers in relation to ECPC "would be more professional than young or inexperienced volunteers due to the sensitive context in which they would be deployed."

The report describes and analyses existing relevant national and international structures for the provision of volunteers for activities in third countries of relevance for ECPC. It also looks into the potential added value of such a new programme compared to existing programmes in the European region. Emphasis has been on trying to identify to which degree it is possible to mobilise from among civil society in EU member states the additional and qualified human resources. Finally, also on the supply-side, ECPC has been studied in relation to other EU volunteer concepts and recruitment mechanism with possible links to ECPC.

The demand-side for ECPC activities has been studied through international organisations working with pre- and post-conflict activities and through a field visit to Ethiopia and Kenya for meetings with the African Union and international NGOs.

### **Background**

The idea of a European Civil Peace Corps was first proposed in the European Parliament in 1995. The original purpose was to provide the EU with an additional instrument for enhancing its external action in the field of conflict prevention and peaceful resolution of conflict in third countries. The proposal was most recently brought forward in the Parliament's resolution of December 2001.

ECPC must now be seen in light of other EU efforts to improve the effectiveness of its assistance to third countries during crises and in particular with regard to non-military interventions at all stages of conflict. The original proposal to create ECPC was introduced at a time when the EU had not yet developed instruments for conflict prevention and crisis management. Today the EU has a number of such tools available, and the analysis of ECPC must take into consideration these tools, as well as the development of the European Security and Defence Policy.

### **Findings and Recommendations**

The study shows that the original thinking behind ECPC is still valid. ECPC can be a flexible and effective instrument to respond to crisis situations world wide. In addition, the establishment of ECPC is likely to support the development of EU-based civil society activities on peace and conflict.

Specific recommendations include:

*Name*

- To fulfil its role, the new ECPC instrument should not include the term “peace corps” in its name, as it is too closely linked with the concept of the US Peace Corps and therefore misleading.

*Starting phase of ECPC*

- It is recommended that the Commission as soon as practically possible establishes a limited pilot ECPC-project in the framework of one or more European NGOs being responsible for recruitment and deployment. Experiences from a pilot project can contribute to the further process of developing a more comprehensive ECPC. This pilot phase should include only a limited number of experts from selected sectors and be dedicated to a narrow range of conflict-related activities.

*Recruitment of experts*

- Qualification and readiness to leave are the two key criteria for the targeting of potential volunteers. ECPC will compete with other recruiting organisations as the pool of qualified and available experts in civilian crisis management is limited. To have access to qualified experts the ECPC structure must include or have access to recruitment specialists with a good knowledge of the sector.
- The European landscape offers a high potential for recruitment of civilians for crisis response. In some of the Member States specialised organisations already maintain well managed systems and rosters to recruit civilian experts for OSCE, UN and NGO missions in conflict prevention and crisis management. Experiences from comparable recruitment systems show that recruitment and pre selection should be based on a decentralised structure.
- Recruitment, deployment and operational activities could be integrated into an agreement with European civil society organisations, based on the concept of the DG ECHO Framework Partnership Agreement. Such set-up would involve European civil society organisations with sufficient capacity in the full ECPC cycle. This study shows that ECPC could contribute to the creation of stronger links between the civil society and the EU in support for activities related to crisis management, conflict prevention and post conflict peace building.

*Management of ECPC*

- The decentralized ECPC system should be managed by a small efficient unit within the Commission. The advantages of a decentralized system outweigh the constraints. There is no common European model for national registration or recruitment of volunteers and professionals for international missions. A small management team in the Commission should be responsible for final selection and cooperation with the relevant framework organisations.

*Deployment structure*

- ECPC activities in third countries must take place in a well defined structure based on clear operational guidelines. Mission support and the ability to work with local structures, thereby gaining local ownership, are both crucial. The report, therefore, proposes to include local professional volunteers in ECPC teams. With support from the EU, and as a related ECPC activity, the report recommends financing capacity building of local civil society institutions in areas of ECPC deployment.
- The role of the EU Delegations needs to be clearly defined in this regard.



### *Training*

- Training courses related to civilian crisis management are organised by specialised agencies all over Europe. The EU has been funding a pilot training programme since 2001.
- There is the need to establish closer links between all existing training initiatives. ECPC could play an important role in this regard. Under the umbrella of ECPC existing training initiatives could be linked and coordinated better. These training initiatives should be developed further and should be integrated into ECPC.
- There is a close link between training and recruitment, which should be taken account for in the structure and concept of ECPC.

### **Next steps**

#### *Pilot project*

- It is recommended that the Commission establishes a pilot ECPC-project in the framework of one or more European NGOs being responsible for recruitment and deployment.

#### *White paper*

- It is recommended that the Commission should develop and produce a White Paper on the establishment of an ECPC.

#### *Consultations*

- In addition, due to the complexity of the issues raised in this study, a full public consultation may be the only procedure conducive to an informed debate about the establishment of an ECPC. The consultation process should include national level discussions involving civil society organisations and should conclude with a conference involving participants from civil society as well as from the main EU institutions with a stake in the ECPC.

## 1. Introduction

This report is a feasibility study on the establishment of a European Civil Peace Corps (ECPC). The feasibility study is carried out by a Consortium of companies led by Channel Research Sprl, in cooperation with COWI A.S. and B&S Europe Ltd. The study was conducted under the Framework Contract (Lot 7) procedure, between April and December 2005.

The idea of a “European Civil Peace Corps” was first introduced in the European Parliament (EP) in 1994. The purpose was to provide the EU with an additional instrument to enhance its external action in the field of conflict prevention and peaceful resolution of conflict in third countries. The proposal was most recently brought forward in the Parliament’s resolution of December 2001 on the Commission’s Communication of Conflict Prevention (based on the *Legendijk Report*)<sup>1</sup>.

ECPC must now be seen in light of other EU efforts to improve the effectiveness of its assistance to third countries in times of crisis and in particular of non-military interventions at all stages of conflict, including early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management. The proposal to establish ECPC is only one among different initiatives in this regard.

According to the Terms of Reference of this study<sup>2</sup>, and the clarifications in the “*Aide-Mémoire*” developed by the Commission after the initial briefing meetings<sup>3</sup>, the “**overall objective**” of the study is to “**provide the services of the European Commission with an analysis of the feasibility of the establishment of an ECPC**”. The “specific objectives” and the main focus of the study are

“the feasibility of the creation of mechanisms to mobilize civilian volunteers for a broad range of activities in third countries related to pre- and post conflict (crisis management and peace building) while the development-type of activities mentioned in the original ToR are not included.”

“On the basis of a review of the existing structures (EU structures, Members States, Red Cross, NGO, others...), the study shall determine whether, under which conditions, and for which type of interventions, the establishment of new EU structure(s) would be justified.”

“The Study shall for such purposes determine the added value of the creation of a new EU structure in addition to those already existing including the complementarity and impact of such a new structure with current EU instruments and funding sources.”

“The anticipated results of the study shall be an analysis of the feasibility and sustainability of the establishment of an ECPC aimed at providing the EU with an additional structure to enhance its external action in the areas of conflict prevention, civilian crisis management and post conflict peace building. It shall propose the most adequate options to be considered.”

This report has the following structure:

The reports starts with a general introduction into the subject, give the background of ECPC and this study. It then looks at existing structures and agencies outside and within the EU.

---

<sup>1</sup> European Parliament Resolution on the Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention (A5-0394/2001)

<sup>2</sup> See Annex 1

<sup>3</sup> See Annex 2

On the basis of these findings key elements of a possible ECPC are analysed and final conclusions made.

Section 1 gives the introduction. Section 2 and 3 describe the methodology and define the ways key terms are defined and used in this report.

Section 4 presents the original idea of ECPC, its background in recent conflicts and the present vision. The ECPC idea -and the key conceptual and strategic issues it raises- are analysed and the idea is placed in the overall context of conflict prevention and post-conflict intervention.

Section 5 describes existing national supply systems for volunteers and development workers within the EU. Subsections are dealing with recruitment, availability, costs, training (including EU training courses) and management issues.

Sections 6 and 7 present specific experiences from international organisations and other EC services working in the same or related fields including a number of organisations with which ECPC-activities will have to be coordinated and in certain cases co-planned.

Sections 8 to 10 deal with key issues related to the recruitment and management of a possible ECPC structure. They deal with the profile of volunteers, the nature and duration of assignments. The set up for recruitment and for the management of ECPC are discussed in detail in these sections.

Section 11 reflects on the potential demand for ECPC-activities in third countries, and the need for coordination, integration and capacity building in relation to local and national peace building and conflict prevention activities. This section is limited in its scope, partly because it was not considered appropriate by the Commission for the Consultants to visit more than one non-EU region and to interview staff in EU delegations before the scope of intervention of ECPC volunteers is defined more precisely by the Commission.

Section 12 deals with the important aspect of training in crisis management and in particular in the context of a possible recruitment and deployment under the umbrella of the EU.

Sections 13 and 14 broaden the picture by reflecting on ECPC in the African context and capturing views of NGOs on the new structure.

Section 15 'Conclusions' includes the description of different options and models for an ECPC structure and proposals for future courses of action, including for the establishment of limited ECPC-pilot schemes and for further studies in specific fields. Section 15 also presents a number of more specific recommendations relating to the issues reviewed in the report.

## 2. Methodology

The study's main focus is to describe and analyse existing relevant national and international structures for the provision of volunteers and professionals for activities in third countries of relevance for ECPC and to look into the potential added value of such a new programme compared to other existing programmes in the European region. This methodology has also made it possible to study the risk of duplication and overlap, the need for clear management structures and mission mandates and for co ordination with relevant international stakeholder organisations.

Emphasis has been on trying to identify the degree to which it is possible to mobilise from among civil society in EU Member States the additional and qualified human resources for pre- and post-conflict activities, and to determine whether a new organisational structure such as the ECPC may be seen by NGOs as a competing structure which could take human resources away from existing activities. The aim has been to identify gaps in provision and to address resource and structural implications of filling these gaps via an ECPC mechanism. This has also made it possible to judge the potential added value of such a new programme compared to other existing programmes in the European region.

The risk of overlap in relation to other EU structures such as the potential European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps (EVHAC) and the current European Voluntary Service (EVS) has also been considered although a feasibility study on EVHAC is in progress and the result not yet known. The risk of overlap in relation to EVHAC and EVS has been considered minor because it was agreed with the Commission that the profile of volunteers in relation to ECPC “would be more professional than young or inexperienced volunteers due to the sensitive context in which they would be deployed” (ECPC Feasibility Study: “*Aide-mémoire*”).<sup>4</sup>

In agreement with the Commission, the study has looked at the European supply side and the organisational aspect of setting up an ECPC. , The demand for ECPC-activities has also been studied both through interviews and meetings with international organisations working with pre-and post conflict activities, and through a field visit to Ethiopia and Kenya for meetings with the African Union (AU) and international NGO's. Experience from other national non-European stakeholders has primarily been studied through interviews with organisations in the USA.

Information has been gathered through:

- Desk work / Telephone / Internet research/ Review of documentation
- Interviews with EU structures
- Interviews with key stakeholders in EU Member States / Europe
- Interviews with key stakeholders outside Europe<sup>5</sup>

Data collection took place over the period April to late September. The period was prolonged due to difficulties in getting access to stakeholders during holiday periods.

A mid-term concept paper summarizing the project achievements and tentative findings was presented to the Commission on 29 July 2005. It was the hope of the study team that the concept paper would result in a feedback from the Commission which could assist in setting directions for the further studies. Such feedback has, however, not been received.

---

<sup>4</sup> See Annex 2

<sup>5</sup> See list of organisations and persons met in Annex 4

## **2.1 Consulted and interviewed organisations**

In accordance with the methodology, the organisations and institutions consulted can be categorised into 4 types:

- National 'supply' type organisations in EU countries that could provide volunteers for assignments in pre- and post crisis situations.
- International 'demand' type organisations that make use of the services of volunteers in pre- and post crisis situations through projects / programmes / actions, etc.
- Organisations which combine 'supply' and 'demand' i.e., they recruit volunteers both for work on their own projects / actions (Red Cross organisations, etc) and in some cases for projects / actions of other organisations (e. g., national refugee organisations also delivering professionals for UNHCR).
- American national organisations with relevant experiences in relation to the ECPC-concept

The full list of organisations and representatives interviewed in person are included in Annex 4. Other organisations like NORDEM in Norway have been consulted by e-mail or telephone.

## **2.2 Field Trips**

Two **field trips** outside Europe were arranged:

- A visit to Washington to study the structures of the US Peace Corps with the purpose of identifying the organisational and cost implications of establishing an ECPC structure along similar lines without seeing the Peace Corps in any way as a model for ECPC. During the visit a number of other relevant organisations were consulted.
- The study team originally proposed field missions to three different relevant conflict regions (conflict, post-conflict, chronic crisis situation). The Commission authorised only a mission to Africa, which included Ethiopia and Kenya. Key stakeholders such as the African Union (AU) and other African 'demand' structures and international organisations were consulted and their preliminary views on an ECPC-type of activity were obtained.

The Consultants have been aware of the fact that the **new EU Member States** are a special challenge in relation to ECPC. The old Member States have longer and more established traditions for international cooperation and also for volunteerism. Efforts have therefore been used to include new members as fully as possible in the study. While national official structures are mostly in place for identifying professionals from national administrations, this is not to the same degree the case in relation to less formal civil society structures in the different countries.

This study concerns the development of the ECPC, a structure which currently does not exist and which would probably not be modelled on any single existing structure. As a result, the experts and NGO representatives interviewed in the course of the research were able and ready to talk in detail about current practices. They were often less willing, however, to express definite views on broader issues regarding the potential of ECPC as the structure scope and concept is not yet fully clear.

The consultants have generally received a very full and positive co-operation from all involved stakeholders. Stakeholders have seen it important to discuss new ways of strengthening and improving civilian EU-activities in pre and post conflict situations.

The fact that a number of other ideas and proposals from within the EU-system are at the moment being discussed as part of the overall development of the European Security and Defence Policy is also creating certain confusion among stakeholders and a certain reservation in some stakeholders' readiness to state their positions. This reservation has also to a certain degree been observed within the Commission and the study is based less on interviews and consultations with different sections of the Commission than originally anticipated.

### 3. Terminology

This brief presentation of key terms has been included for the convenience of the reader – it does not purport to suggest that the authors are closing off the consideration of aspects other than those summarised here. Instead, the objective of the terminology discussion is to ensure that participants in the discussion of ECPC share an understanding of the key terms – or at least are able to identify which terms may be ambiguous and need further clarification.

#### **Volunteers**

This notion covers both people who work without receiving any salary or indemnity (although they may receive support in kind, such a food, transport and housing), and people who work and receive indemnities and/or a salary, albeit at non-commercial or non-market rates. In some countries the two categories are referred to with different words: *Bénévoles* and *Volontaires* in French, for example.

For the purposes of the ECPC, it is assumed that the volunteers would belong to the latter category: their profile would call for a degree of expertise and experience that seems incompatible with bénévolat, per se.

#### **Crisis**

For the purposes of the ECPC we assume the crisis (state of tension and instability, with or without overt armed violence) is of a political nature, even though it may be related to a natural catastrophe or humanitarian emergency. The level of conflict compatible with intervention by the ECPC needs specific discussion.

#### **Crisis management**

Processes, programmes and activities aimed at reducing tensions in a crisis and decreasing instability. These could include all aspects of conflict transformation (prevention, management, post-conflict reconstruction, peace-building, etc), as well as support to other actors' activities such as development projects (for example, to make them more conflict-sensitive). The notion also includes such tasks as human rights monitoring and reporting, mediation at various levels, etc. The aspects on which the ECPC could intervene would therefore need specific discussion.

#### **Peace Corps**

Body of volunteers carrying out conflict transformation activities in political crisis situations. A Peace Corps such as the ECPC would differ from its US namesake in that it would not generally carry out development activities – except to the extent such activities may be integral to conflict transformation.

#### **Neutrality**

The fact of not supporting either side in a conflict. Many stakeholders interviewed for this study insisted that it would be essential for the ECPC to be neutral, and to be seen to be neutral. This requirement may have wide-ranging practical implications, particularly in relation to conflicts in which the EU, or even individual Member States, may be believed to be supporting one side over another. The neutrality of the ECPC may also be questioned, for example, if the EU is involved in armed peacekeeping operations.

## 4. The idea of ECPC - The background and the vision

The concept of ECPC is based on an idea from Italy's Alexander Lager (MEP) and first introduced in 1994 at a time when the EU had not yet developed instruments for conflict prevention or crisis management. The background was the international community's failure in the **Balkan crisis**. Although the development of the conflict was realized, the international community did not find a way to prevent it.

The idea of the ECPC was to enable civilian professionals to contribute to avoiding that an existing crisis becomes violent. The idea is therefore that, by using civilian professionals with the right qualifications, in the right way, and at the right time, it may become possible to prevent at a later stage the need to use armed force.

A lot has happened since the proposal was adopted by the parliament in 1999. The EU has developed more instruments for crisis management. There is now among others a conflict prevention and crisis management unit. And there is the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) and a number of other EU instruments related to actions and interventions related to crisis.<sup>6</sup>

The aim of the European Parliament's recommendations was to develop a **flexible instrument** which could be used in short notice. It was considered important to involve NGO's in the civil society, because many other mechanisms make primary use of the public sector e.g. through the ministries of foreign affairs. The ECPC-proposal is emphasising "that many specialised NGO's, many of them with detailed and extensive field experience, could give a precious contribution to such a project"

In 1999 it was considered possible to see the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) in former Yugoslavia as a first step on the way to establishing an ECPC, but the proposal at the same time stressed that experiences of the ECMM and the Kosovo verification mission did also show the limitations of the concept of ECPC. The need for proper training was stressed as well as the necessary security precautions including focusing at the undesirable political consequences it would have if the inadequate deployment of unarmed observers were taken hostage.

The thinking behind the proposal was that a possible ECPC operation could, for example, be to deploy **professional civilians** with the relevant background in a border village in the Balkans in an area of tensions between two parties who do no longer speak with each other, and where political rhetoric only makes things worse. External expertise could support local mediation and help strengthening the communities own capacity for de-escalation of conflict and peace building.

The thinking was never to create a large corps of inexperienced volunteers, but possibly a mix of both less and more experienced personnel, with recruitment based on procedures ensuring that only qualified personnel were recruited, and obligatory general training as well as both function- and mission-specific preparation.

The ECPC was not seen as an alternative to ordinary peace-keeping missions or as an instrument which could give rise to overlaps with organisations already working in the field, such as the OSCE, but rather as complementary, when necessary, to conflict preventive actions in cooperation with the OSCE and the UN. It was recognized that interventions need to be coordinated on an international level; related to the needs of the population in the conflict area; compatible with the civil society and other actors in the field; non-violent and

---

<sup>6</sup> For an overview see Civilian Instruments for EU Crisis Management, EC Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit, April 2003: [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/cfsp/doc/cm03.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/doc/cm03.pdf)



distinct from enforcement actions; flexible and practical; and capable of counteracting violent escalations at an early point.

The proposal was also seen as a way of establishing a new instrument to support a stronger contribution from relevant **NGOs** to international peace efforts. NGOs working with peace and peace building were seen often to be under-funded, and there was and is a need to strengthen activities of this type. Some of the people behind the original ECPC-proposal to day see the German Civil Peace Service (ZFD) as something close to the original thinking of ECPC, although ZFD works with long-term deployment of German peace workers.

Proper **training** was considered very important. Arno Truger, who is now director at the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR) in Burg and involved in the EU training programme, was one of the most instrumental people in developing the ECPC concept.

A number of new EU instruments have been developed since the European Parliament recommended the establishment of ECPC. One of them is the **Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM)** based on a Council regulation (EC) 381/2001. RRM has the main objective to safeguard or re-establish the conditions under which the partner countries of the EU can pursue their long-term development goals, and RRM can finance self-contained projects for up to six months in such fields as:

- Mediation, arbitration and reconciliation;
- Re-establishment and consolidation of rule of law and civilian administration;
- Rehabilitation and reconstruction;
- Civil Society Development;
- High level policy advice, including the planning of economic reconstruction;
- Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration.

RRM is today seen by some of the supporters of ECPC to be an extra instrument which can support the function of ECPC and provide financial resources which can be used for funding local organisations and capacity building as an integrated and necessary part of ECPC-activities. In Annex 5 a chart based on the Commissions document “Civilian Instruments for EU Crisis Management” is presented<sup>7</sup>. It shows the position of ECPC in the today’s structure. It also highlights liknkages to other present instruments (regional and thematic).

The **original proposal** is not very specific regarding the structure of operation and management of ECPC activities in conflict areas. It is said that the EU will function only under a mandate backed by the UN or its regional organisations: OSCE, OAU and OAS. And it is stressed, that:

“As an official body, the ECPC differs from NGOs. However, the ECPC’s work will rely on efficient cooperation with NGOs and will strengthen and legitimate NGO work. The ECPC will be structured and organised independently of military bodies, but will rely on cooperation with the military where ECPC missions coincide with peace keeping operations”.

The wording indicates that when NGOs and/or individuals work for ECPC they should “feel” they work for the European Union. They need to acknowledge that they will be part of a European Union Mission. Missions will be accountable to the EU. By this way the ECPC would also contribute to the creation or further development of a EU citizenship. The ECPC should represent Europe but can and should work and coordinate with others including UN and regional bodies like the African Union (AU).

---

<sup>7</sup> [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/cfsp/doc/cm03.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/doc/cm03.pdf)

Part of the background for ECPC was in the 1990's seen as being the need for having more organised and planned civilian interventions. The military has a capacity for overall planning and the development of scenarios. The ECPC is seen as a means to respond to the need for civilian activities planned in a more organised way. The word "peace corps" was used from the beginning of the thinking also to send a signal about planned and organised action, although the thinking was not along the lines of the old and well-known American Peace corps – the main difference between the ECPC and the (US) Peace Corps being that the latter is largely focused on development work involving volunteers with relatively little professional experience (see below Section 8).

Recent developments have influence on the possible creation of ECPC. In September 2004 the Commission introduced a proposal to rationalise its instrument for the provision of external assistance for the budgetary period 2007-2013.<sup>8</sup> This proposal included a new instrument for crisis response, which is called the '**Stability Instrument**'. The aim of this initiative is to improve the link between Community and CFSP operations and streamline short-term crisis response with longer-term EU programmes.

The proposal for the 'Stability Instrument' was made in the context of a broader reform to reduce the existing number of instruments to only six, of which four of them new. At present the EU external assistance is carried out through more than thirty legal instruments (geographical, thematic, and for example the Rapid Reaction Mechanism). Today a EU crisis response can be based on seven different EU financing instruments. Each instrument falls under different regulations, principles and budget positions.

Within the given policy framework the 'Stability Instrument' would make a more flexible, efficient and coherent response to crisis situations in third countries possible. The instrument includes a decision-making process, which is based on first rapid action (similar to the present RRM) and further action on a mid- or even long-term basis if necessary. Additionally to crisis response the instrument is intended to address transborder issues related to civilian security. These include fight against trafficking, organized crime, terrorism and nuclear safety. It also includes potential funding of international peace-keeping capacities together with regional organizations.

Because of the inclusion of nuclear safety legal incompatibilities of articles dealing with development and economic cooperation (Art 179 and 181a of the Treaty Establishing the European Community- EC Treaty) and the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty) arose. The Commission decided to propose that the 'Stability Instrument' should have its legal basis in Article 308 of the EC Treaty, which foresees a consultation process of the EP only. The European Parliament sees in the proposed legal set up a threat to the EP's decision-making role as under Article 179 and 181a of the EC Treaty a co-decision process applies.<sup>9</sup> The EP insisted that the co-decision procedure applies to the 'Stability Instrument'. This position is supported by a number of NGOs engaging in peace building.<sup>10</sup>

The EU Member States are in favour of creating a more flexible instrument but have reservations concerning the Commission's **competence** to follow objectives such as peacebuilding and political stabilization through its external assistance programmes. The decision-making process and the scope of the instrument are seen to undermine the competences of other EU bodies. As a consequence the scope of the new instrument has

---

<sup>8</sup> COM (2004) 0626 "Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Instruments for External Assistance under the Future Financial Perspective 2007-2013

<sup>9</sup> European Parliament, Financial Perspective 2007-2013, Working Document no 15 on the Stability Instrument and the CFSP. [http://www.europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/2004\\_2009/documents/dt/556/556529/556529en.pdf](http://www.europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dt/556/556529/556529en.pdf)

<sup>10</sup> See for example EPLO-European Peacebuilding Liaison Office: Comment on the Proposal for a Regulation of the Council establishing an Instrument for Stability, 23 May 2005, [www.eplo.org/documents/EPLOPolicyPaperStabilityInstrument.doc](http://www.eplo.org/documents/EPLOPolicyPaperStabilityInstrument.doc)

been reduced, excluding nuclear safety and peace support operations. Some areas highly relevant for ECPC are still contested. Those include conflict prevention, security sector reform, disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, and small arms and light weapons.

Those areas -and therefore also activities under a possible ECPC- fall into the **grey zone of competences** between the Commission and the Council. Both are active in civilian crisis response and there is not always an agreement on how far the competences go. This problematic is discussed extensively and can not be taken up within this study. The modus operandi of the ECPC may have significant political implication, and should therefore probably be agreed at political level. However the ongoing debate has influenced this study and the willingness of stakeholders to provide information and opinion.

## 5. Existing structures for European civilian recruitment

This chapter serves to draw up an inventory of existing models for recruitment and deployment of civilian professionals for third-world activities and also to describe potential structures for ECPC recruitment. Although the country visits undertaken did not allow, or attempt, to constitute a comprehensive inventory of the potential sources of volunteers for the ECPC, they did provide a reasonably representative sample of the processes and approaches currently used throughout the EU. However, while structures exist in all parts of the EU, the great differences between countries and EU regions should not be underestimated. This chapter will be followed by a more detailed and practice-oriented analysis of organisations recruiting volunteers.

### 5.1 Overview

The specific objective of this study is the feasibility of the creation of mechanisms to mobilize civilian professionals and especially qualified human resources from the civil societies of Europe for a broad range of pre- and post-conflict activities in non-EU countries: civilian crisis management, conflict prevention, post conflict peace building and rehabilitation.

The **focus on civil society** is justified because it is the general understanding in the Commission that national recruitment systems focusing on central administrations and the public sectors generally are in place and working in EU countries, whereas in relation to the ECPC the key channel for resource mobilisation is civil society. EU Member States have a wealth of NGOs working in third countries with humanitarian, emergency and development assistance and also have a tradition of deploying different types of volunteers and professionals. A number of different European, EU-related, network and liaison offices exist to coordinate activities in the different fields and also to establish platforms in relation to the EU.

In spite of such coordination and networking efforts, there are very **different national systems** and traditions for providing volunteers and development workers for humanitarian- and development-oriented missions, and deployment is based on very different principles. Similarly there is no uniformity in the way different EU Member States at present recruit civilian professionals for serving with the EU, OSCE and the UN. While the national Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) are mostly involved in recruitment for OSCE and the UN, recruitment for United Nations Volunteers (UNV) is often made through national NGOs. The role and involvement of civil society organisations in MFA-led recruitment differ from country to country.

As a central part of this study 9 EU Member States have been visited and interviews been made with the most relevant representatives for organisations involved in recruitment and deployment of civilian personnel. The 9 countries are: Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland and the UK. Other Member States have been covered through written documentation and interviews with umbrella organisations and networks in Brussels. Two non-Member States, Norway and Switzerland have also been covered.

For several reasons the **new EU Member States** have less developed and less comprehensive recruitment systems. Most of them have only few years of experience with international development and emergency activities, they have less developed civil societies and fewer NGO's with international activities, and most countries have traditionally been less active in recruitment e. g. for OSCE. Financing has also been a major problem in relation to recruitment and deployment.

However, the difference between the civil societies in the old and the new Member States is not the only regional difference. There is also a less marked difference between Northern and Southern civil societies in Europe. Southern NGOs have in general been less involved than Northern NGOs in recruitment and deployment of civilian volunteers for international activities outside the sphere of the state.

**Differences** include the question of national rosters or resource banks with names of qualified civilian professionals ready to be deployed with short notices or longer notice. Many, but far from all, national NGO's with international activities, have their own rosters created on the basis on own principles and organisational needs. Some MFAs have rosters with potential candidates for election observer missions and other short-term missions. In some countries, but not most, there is cooperation between government and NGO-rosters.

Different traditions and capacities for recruitment and deployment both in the East and the West as well as in the North and the South have to be considered in the creation of a European system for ECPC-recruitment.

The European variation is first described through a brief presentation of some of the national recruitment systems and some of the different NGO-systems. An inventory of recruitment models follows this presentation. Specific experiences regarding training and remuneration are subsequently dealt with in subsections.

## **5.2 National and NGO- recruitment systems**

### *Germany*

German recruitment of civilian professionals for third countries is characterised by a well developed and comprehensive cooperation between the government system and NGO-systems.

The main organisations are: ZIF, DEC, and ZFD

**ZIF** (Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze, Centre for International Peace Operations) was previously incorporated into the German MFA, is now is a private entity under the government used for recruitment of civilians for short term missions to OSCE, UN and EU. ZIF maintains a roster with 850 profiles, 80% being from the civil society. The actual number of civilians in short term missions (2005) is 200.

**DED** (German Development Service) is a non-profit government owned organisation for personnel cooperation under the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). DED has a rapidly growing experience from activities related to conflict transformation and peace building in crisis-torn countries. Since 1999 local partner organisations in 14 countries have been supported in civilian conflict resolution and peace building. DED has sent about 70 people to partner countries for such missions. The average assignments are 2-3 years. DED tries to group people in a few crisis countries, ideally 5 peace workers per country, to maximise the impact of their contribution. DED is currently undertaking an evaluation of its ZFD-component.

**ZFD** (Ziviler Friedensdienst, German Civil Peace Service) is a co-operation between organisations with DED being the biggest, but also including a NGO-consortium consisting of seven German peace- and development organisations. The core task is the deployment of long term peace experts with peace building objectives within the overall framework of German development Cooperation. ZFD is financed by the German government.

ZFD is posting peace workers for minimum periods of 24 months with the possibility of extension. The actual number of posted peace workers is 110. DED has its own roster of candidates for deployment, whereas recruitment in the smaller organisations is based on a case-by-case search for candidates. The smaller organisations do not have own rosters.

Through the two structures ZFD and ZIF, it is in principle possible to approach all parts of the German society (state and non-state) in recruitment efforts for all types of missions related to crisis-prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict peace-building. It seems to be the most organised way in any EU country of creating a system which is utilising the capacity from with the civil society as well as the government structure for providing professional volunteers for peace related international activities. In some ways the development of ZFD, however, is still in a relative initial stage. It is not yet well known in the general public and some of the involved organisations are relatively small.

### *Norway*

Norway has a number of volunteer sending public supported or financed NGO's including the Norwegian Peace Corps (Fredskorpset). The most relevant institutions in relation to ECPC however is Nordem.

**Nordem** is the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights administered by the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights (NCHR) at University of Oslo. Nordem is unique in the sense that it is based on a formal cooperation between the civil society and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Centre for Human Rights and the Norwegian Refugee Council.

Nordem is administering two rosters:

- a) a stand-by-force operated together with the refugee council and established for rapid deployment of civilian personnel both as election observers and e. g. for human rights monitoring and investigation of human rights violations, and
- b) a resource base for recruitment based on longer notice and preparation and focusing on requests from a broad range of thematic areas relevant for democracy and human rights activities. This base is administered solely by the Centre.

Each of the two rosters has app. 200 members. Nordem recruits from the government sector as well as from NGO's in the civil society.

### *Denmark*

The main volunteer organisation in Denmark has traditionally been **MS** (Danish Association for International Cooperation) which traditionally has deployed volunteers (now called development workers) in third countries financed by the Danish government (Danida). MS is also the national recruitment agency for UNV, but recruitment is not based on an existing database.

The Danish government is formally financing and supporting the recruitment and posting of short term professionals through four different rosters. Postings of professionals up to a ceiling are financed from the same parliament appropriation.

The four rosters are:

- **IHB** (International Humanitarian Service) which is a unit in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, responsible for recruitment to organisations like OSCE, EU and in some cases UN.

- **Danish Refugee Council** recruiting professionals primarily for international missions related to the organisations own core mandate such as e. g. for UNHCR, but responds also to other requests within the organisations field of competence.
- **Danish Red Cross**, responsible for recruitment to the international Red Cross system
- **Médecins sans Frontières** (in Denmark: Læger uden grænser) recruiting for the MsF-system.

The four rosters are financed from the same government sources, but contrary to the Norwegian Nordem-base the system is not based on a formal coordination of rosters.

#### *France*

The MFA manages the recruitment and assignment of short- and long-term professionals in international organisations such as UN agencies and the OSCE. Large NGOs such as Médecins Sans Frontières recruit directly, but many development and humanitarian NGOs are regrouped in an association named **Coordination Sud** (CS). CS fulfils the following functions in relation to the recruitment of volunteers:

- Advice to NGOs on recruitment best practice, legal aspects, management, etc.
- Advice to prospective volunteers on organisations suitable to their skills and experience;

The Coordination does not formally have its own roster of volunteers and candidates, it is however informally keeping files on individuals and may put volunteers and NGOs in contact with each other.

#### *The Netherlands*

Presently there is no national Dutch civil society structure for the provision of civilian professionals for conflict related purposes, but a number of NGO's support efforts to strengthen the potential for providing civilian professionals with short notice for conflict management and other peace related missions, outside the traditional sphere of MFA-recruitment of short term professionals for OSCE and the UN.

**Care NL** is a recent independent member of Care International and not a typical member. Care NL has a former background as an organisation especially working with rehabilitation in post conflict situations and conflict management. Care NL has a database of experts with 3-400 names, but it is not 100 % operational. It has an interest in expanding the database at a European level if it can be financed. Postings are financed by the Dutch government's Personnel Service Overseas.

**Novib** (Oxfam NL) is a member of European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO). It is not on its own a personnel-sending NGO but support EPLO and the idea of establishing ECPC because the work for peace and democracy is part of the organisations core mandate.

**NEAG** is Netherlands Expertise Centre Alternative to Violence. It was founded in 2001 by a number of peace organisations and individuals and works especially with training in peace education and conflict management. NEAG, with support from other Dutch NGO's, sees it self as a potential possible focal point for mobilisation of professionals from the civil society.

#### *United Kingdom*

Apart from professionals seconded to international organisations (a process managed by the Foreign Office), a large number of volunteers work abroad under the auspices of **Voluntary Services Overseas** (VSO). VSO carries out a limited amount of own development projects (mostly training and teaching activities), but the bulk of its work is to recruit, train and support volunteers working for other organisations: these can be British or foreign NGOs, UK

government departments such as DFID and semi-governmental agencies such as the British Council.

Although VSO reckons it has files on at least 40,000 individuals, it does not have a single database of volunteers – indeed it believes that data protection regulations would prevent the inclusion of existing files into a new database, except with the formal agreement of each individual.

Many NGOs have their own roster of volunteers and there is no significant attempt or will to pool this information (again, data protection legislation would make this difficult anyway). A number of humanitarian and development NGOs have come together in an organisation known as **People In Aid**, to develop policies and principles of human resources management, which are likely to become increasingly accepted as a standard for all.

**Peaceworkers UK** has as one of the organisations main activities to run courses related to civilian crisis management. Peaceworkers UK is running a number of core courses and specialisation courses in conflict transformation for the EU.

Over the last two years Peaceworkers UK has been developing the Peaceworkers' Register as a database of people interested and potentially available for work in the areas of conflict prevention, crisis management and peace building. The register is seen as a first step towards the building of a wider Civilian Peace Reserve. The register exists already and consists in October 2005 of app. 300 people. The plan is that it will be fully on line before the end of 2005.

Use of the register will be based on contractual agreements with possible clients. Peaceworkers UK works with the different European peace networks, including the organisations and institutions in EPLO, and there will e. g. be a partnership agreement with Form ZFD in Germany and other similar relevant NGO's in other EU-countries. Agreements and partnership will be based on common quality standards for recruitment.

The register is in principle open for all qualified candidates wanting to register, and the candidates choose category, but actual recruitment is based on quality control. At the moment this means that the register is only operative for candidates from within the UK. A number of non-British candidates including Africans have registered, but because of the need for individual quality checks they are not being used actively at the moment

Peaceworkers UK has cooperated with the British **RedR**-register. RedR was originally established as a roster for engineers, but has developed to become a major register for experts in all humanitarian fields. The cooperation is technical. The idea is there should be no overlap. Red R is for humanitarian activities, and the Peaceworkers UK-register for conflict related activities.

The Peaceworkers register will also be used as a recruitment agency for relevant clients working with conflict related activities. Candidates for the register come from many different sources and trades of life, including from academic institutions, from NGO's and from among former volunteers and development workers.

### *Estonia*

In Estonia the government institution **Estonia Rescue Board** (created through the merger of the national fire service and civil defence) is very active in international cooperation primarily in relation to emergencies and humanitarian relief activities. The rescue board has a roster of app. 80 people, mostly for emergency relief. A number of Estonians have been trained. The rescue Board is also cooperating with ECHO, but the managers are stressing that new



instruments or mechanisms or rosters do not necessarily increase the number of available qualified professionals.

#### *Poland*

Recruitment for OSCE e. g. of election observers are also in the new Member States the responsibility of MFA's but lack of funds and capacity has e. g. in Poland resulted in the outsourcing of OSCE-recruitment to the **Batory Foundation** (part of the network of George Soros-foundations).

There is still only a limited number of NGO's being operative outside Europe. Polish Humanitarian Organisation (PAH) is active with missions and personnel in Chechnya, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan. Recruitment is however often seen as a struggle. No roster or database exists and positions are advertised

NGO-representatives both in Poland and Estonia stress that there is only a limited number of people with experience and especially with field experience outside Europe. There is no formal overall mapping of the existing capacity or amount of available experts or professionals.

#### *Hungary*

The same is true in Hungary, where there is a thriving NGO scene, including organisations working on conflict and armed violence. But most NGOs work on domestic matters and those that work abroad cover nearby countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Romania, Ukraine). The situation of the Roma is a focus of activity, as is the situation of Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries. In July a new law was passed, recognising volunteering and giving some employment-like rights to volunteers.

### **5.3 European networks and platforms**

Meetings with national NGOs and government representatives have been supplemented with a number of meetings with representatives from European institutions and civil society platforms and networks, such as Voice (Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in emergencies), Eurostep, Isis Europe (International Security Information Service, Europe), EPLO (European Peacebuilding Liaison Office), Forum (International Forum on Development Service) and Nonviolent Peaceforce.

Membership of European platforms and networks documents that the activity level is very different from country to country and Eastern European organisations still play only a minor role in this type of civil society cooperation in Europe. Organisations such as Eurostep (working with long term development) and Voice (working with emergencies) are however active in trying to involve organisations in the new Member States more at the European level.

There seems to be a growing activity and cooperation with a focus on peace building, pre and post conflict activities and crisis management e. g. through EPLO. Such activities however are also primarily based on activities in a limited number of European countries.

### **5.4 Conclusions**

The European landscape offers a high potential for recruitment of civilians for crisis response. In some of the Member States specialised organisations already maintain well

managed systems and rosters to recruit civilian experts for OSCE, UN and NGO missions in conflict prevention and crisis management. Those agencies could be taken into consideration for a possible European network for recruitment for ECPC.

However, the number and kinds of European recruitment agencies being relevant for ECPC are diverse and manifold. The significant differences between national systems have implications for an attempt to set up a Europe wide recruitment standard or system. The new Member States cannot yet be seen on the same level as some of the –especially Northern- EU Member States, when it comes to providing and managing civilian experts.

## 6. Specific lessons and experiences from other organisations

This chapter deals with a selection of lessons and experiences from other organisations, which are highly relevant for a EU volunteer peace building organisation. The chapter shows practical examples of existing volunteer corps, recruiting and sending organisations. It includes practices from state and non-state organisations that are either specialised in conflict resolution and peace building, but also organisations that are not working in this area but in other sectors, such as development.

The chapter is divided into sections that deal with the most important key issues for a volunteer corps. It is not a comprehensive overview of volunteer organisations, does not describe one organisation in detail, and does not want to present one model structure for a possible ECPC. Instead this study has selected only those key aspects of the analysed organisations that are of interest and relevance for ECPC. In an annex more details on the organisations and their solutions for recruitment and deployment are provided.<sup>11</sup>

The selected aspects here are:

- Recruitment, incl. access to qualified ‘experts’, age and experience of volunteers, management of rosters
- Benefits and entitlements
- Training
- Mission support
- Local ownership and local partners
- Budget and range
- Possible cooperation with the EU
- Other experiences and examples

### 6.1 Recruitment

This section deals with examples from existing recruitment schemes starting first with the decision about a target group, the access to qualified candidates and focussing in the following place on the management of applicants and rosters. For the EU as a multi-lateral organisation the decision whether to have a central roster or to work through the Member States is of crucial importance. This section will look at existing recruitment systems with the same problematic.

#### Target and age groups

There is a huge variety of volunteer organisations worldwide addressing all kind of groups of people for potential volunteer positions. Additionally some of the larger volunteer organisations address different kinds of groups for their organisation and deploy different categories of volunteers. The UNV for example include (young) UNV interns, online volunteers, private sector employees and retirees, etc). For the ECPC the International **UNV** Specialists, which form 60-65 % of all assignments is the most interesting group of volunteers for ECPC. An International UNV Specialist is defined as:

“a professional recruited for his/her professional qualifications and his/her readiness to serve under volunteer conditions without regard to financial benefit”.

---

<sup>11</sup> See Annex 6

UN Volunteers can serve more assignments, presently there is a maximum limit of 8 years. There are no age limitations.

Among specialised organisations there is a tendency to look out more and more for very qualified and experienced volunteers. This causes difficulties in recruitment and sets limitations to some recruitment for urgent or sensitive operations. First of all the pool of experts available in specialised sectors is limited. Secondly the availability and readiness to leave on missions on short notice is less likely with more senior and experienced candidates.

**OSCE** and **UN** vacancy announcements are more and more demanding: there is more need for specialised experts, less need for generalist. Experts must be able to start their work right away, without prior qualification or adaptation in the field (higher professionalisation). This makes it difficult for younger/more inexperienced experts to be nominated for missions.

On the other hand **OSCE** has realised that fast deployment is easier with younger professionals. This, together with the fact that there is a limited pool of experienced senior experts in the sector is willing to work on a volunteer basis, that in reality at OSCE in Peacekeeping Operations and Peace-building (in spite of the sensitivities involved) personnel tend to be younger and less experienced than in classical development cooperation, and this is true also for **UNVs**.

There is a lack of qualified human resources for all organizations working in the relevant areas. All organizations are therefore competing for them. Lack of right people or more precisely lack of the right people available for the place where you need them at a given time (difficulties in recruiting for high risk francophone countries right now, for instance) and therefore organizations end up relying sometimes on younger/less experienced personnel in these situations.

Most of the **US Peace Corps** volunteers are young (about 25 years old) and relatively inexperienced from a professional point of view (95% have college degrees, mostly undergraduate degrees, and 2/3 years of initial work experience in the USA). There is a portion of volunteers (6%) over 50 years (the oldest volunteer is 82) which raises the average age of the Peace Corps to 28 years. On the other hand a volunteer could be as young as 18 and have no work experience whatsoever. The selection criteria used both in the application process and as part of the evaluation during pre-service training are: motivation, productive competence, emotional maturity and adaptability and skills.

USPC has a very large structure. The Peace Corps are deploying some 7,500 volunteers per year (7,733 in 2004). The proposed budget request for 2006 is of US\$ 345 million. The magnitude of the organization can be clearly expressed, for instance, by the yearly allotment for Volunteer Selection and Recruitment amounting to over US\$ 15 million. This office oversees the recruitment of volunteers through 11 branch offices across the United States. It assesses the technical and personal skills of applicants and matches qualified persons to specific volunteer projects. Applicants go through a multifaceted and competitive screening process that includes interviews, evaluations and reference checks.

About 80% of the **German Centre for International Peace Operations** (ZIF) data base members are from civil society. ZIF is doing active advocacy for its missions at civil society organisations. The Centre employs recruitment experts from the sector with experience from volunteer organisations such as UNV. This is among other reasons the cause why ZIF is quite successful with their recruitment. In OSCE missions for example there are 20% Germans represented.

As regards volunteers, the International **Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies** (IFRC) applies a strict definition (totally unpaid – reimbursement of very limited

expenses incurred in performing the job). The above rigid definitions become quite clear when put into IFRC perspective. International staff deployed are never volunteers but paid professionals – volunteers are always local people stepping in to support National Societies (alongside local employees – when volunteer activities extend over time, their situation is transformed to that of contracted employee). In other words, IFRC considers that the concept of volunteerism is rather inappropriate for international staff that might be deployed to field operations.<sup>12</sup>

Of course, IFRC is in a better position than other agencies to achieve the necessary mix of international and local human resources because it works with National Societies and these are auxiliary to their national governments in addressing crisis in beneficiary countries. It is a paramount aim of IFRC to build National Societies that are truly reflecting the overall local society. IFRC has experienced that there is an untapped pool of human resources in Latin America and Asia (and perhaps in Africa as well). Organisations should be cautious on a process drawing people only from Europe and use instead more south-south horizontal exchange to be more effective on the ground. Training of local and national capacities has to be built in order to develop skills locally.

For volunteer positions **Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative (CEELI)** only considers attorneys with a minimum of five years legal experience (in addition to legal expertise in the substantive area for the specific position, interpersonal skills, motivation etc); international experience and foreign language skills are preferred but not generally required. As a result, some 65% of CEELI volunteers are in the 35-40 years bracket while the remaining 35% are older (50-60 years). CEELI receives a huge number of applications and finally selects some 5% of all applicants.

**ACDI/VOCA** is a private, non profit international development organization created by the consolidation of Agricultural Cooperative Development International and Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance. A minimum of 200 volunteers are deployed each year. In the last three years, 700 people were sent abroad to serve on 1200 assignments (volunteers may have more than one assignment as they are an integral part of longer-term systemic projects). Some of these volunteers are very loyal to ACDI/VOCA and are called upon repeatedly. There are over 10,000 potential volunteers registered in the database.

In addition to qualifications and expertise, volunteers must be very interested and motivated. Furthermore they must be available at the time the assignment takes place. ACDI/VOCA volunteers are usually professors, business people, bankers and entrepreneurs and are not by and large development professionals.

Selection, recruitment, administrative arrangements and actual deployment take altogether only one month from the time ACDI/VOCA has received a placement request for a volunteer. It may even take just one week if, given the type of profile required, the volunteer expert is already known at the time of the request. At any rate, by and large, the entire process is very effective and fast. Volunteers are not always necessarily Americans: the Iraq program is managed by a French national.

#### Data base management, roster

At a first glance the possibilities of IT based solutions for the management of applicants and rosters seem to be very attractive for an efficient and low-cost management. Looking at practical examples of rosters of agencies specialised in peace-building and conflict resolution shows that an active management of rosters is necessary to be successful in recruiting. And the resources necessary to manage a big data base is -despite the IT support- considerable.

---

<sup>12</sup> IFRC Volunteering Policy, Implementation Guide 2005 and Voluntary Service, Volunteer management cycle, 2004

The UN data base (“Galaxy”)<sup>13</sup> for example has about 10.000 members, which are managed by 14 people.

**ZIF** follows the approach of an active data base management. Personal contact to members and applicants is very important for the recruitment department. But the active management is not only limited to ZIF’s staff. Members of the roster are also expected to be active and to update their profiles regularly. To bind experts to the organisation on a longer-term, ZIF organises or initiates yearly meetings of returnees and “jour fix” for mission members in the field. These initiatives are highly appreciated among the members and also serve the continuing development of the data base.

**Peaceworkers UK** runs as one of the organisations main activities courses related to civilian crisis management. Peaceworkers UK is running a number of core courses and specialisation courses in conflict transformation for the EU. Over the last 2 years Peaceworkers UK has been developing the Peaceworkers Register as a database of people interested and potentially available for work in the areas of conflict prevention, crisis management and peace building. The register is seen as a first step towards the building of a wider Civilian Peace Reserve. The register exists already and consists in October 2005 of app. 300 people. PeaceWorkers UK works actively with the candidates in the register who are at the highest competency levels and those who are most likely to be deployed. Registration starts with candidates deciding themselves how to register, but the quality control implies that all people are checked actively and individually before deployment. Candidates in the register receive reminders every third months for up dating and to be sure they are still active.

The idea is to develop the register and to have more people than the present 300 in the register. A size between 1.000 and 2.000 candidates is seen as the optimum, possibly with the lower level as the more realistic. A bigger register will not make the individual quality control possible.

The aim is to develop a register based on 12 main categories of people plus a number of subcategories within each category.

The main categories are:

1. Conflict transformation
2. Human security
3. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
4. Human rights
5. Democratisation
6. Elections
7. Civil administration
8. Media development
9. Rule of law
10. Civil society development
11. Mission management
12. Mission administration and support.

Candidates are registered at 5 competency levels for the purpose of training, assessments and recruitment. Level 5 is for senior people with extensive experience including field experience in the different areas. The register is in principle open for all qualified candidates wanting to register, and the candidates choose their category, but the system is based on quality control and as a consequence it is only operating actively with people who can be checked. At the moment this means that the roster is limited to applicants from within the UK.

---

<sup>13</sup> UN Human Resources e-staffing systems; <https://jobs.un.org/Galaxy/Release3/vacancy/vacancy.aspx>

A number of non-British candidates including Africans have registered, but because of the need for individual quality checks they are not being used at the moment.

At **OSCE**-Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (**REACT**) there are now 12 standard Fields of Expertise: Human Rights, Rule of Law, Democratisation, Elections, Economic and Environmental Affairs, Press and Public Information, Media Development, Political Affairs, Administration and Support, General Staff and Monitoring Functions, Military Affairs and Civilian Police.

All positions are then broken down according to four functional levels: Senior Management, Senior Professional, Middle Management and Professional (relatively junior). The matrix include clear sets of standards also for the selection: criteria (education/experience) and minimum requirements (mandatory, desirable etc), leaving aside only those specific requirements which depend largely on the type of mission/location and are then developed on case by case basis in consultation with the Head of Mission.

The second essential element which was developed to make the REACT concept possible is a web-based extranet linking all actors involved in the recruitment and selection process. These include participating States, the Secretariat and the field missions. Through this carefully designed extranet, OSCE is now able to efficiently manage all the documentation involved in the referred process.

Out of the 55 OSCE Member States, 42 are linked to the system according to different modalities they have chosen. For instance, 31 countries are already fully connected online while 10/11 countries have a link redirecting access to their national recruitment websites. 12 Member States are currently not linked to the REACT extranet and are not seconding personnel to OSCE.

#### Centralised or national recruitment

A good knowledge of national systems is an important factor for a good recruitment. Recruiters need to know national labour law, national organisations (civil society and public), national training and education courses (university courses in peace building, conflict management, etc) and much more to be able to find the best qualified candidates. This sets limitations to a register on a central EU level. This is why **UNV and OSCE** rely on national partners. This also guarantees participation and stronger identification of nationals.

Additionally a central register would imply problems with data protection (rights of data base members) as different countries have different standards. For example the German **ZIF** data base would not be possible in Poland as the citizens' rights are stronger in Poland.

At the **OSCE** Secretariat the point was made quite clearly that REACT is extremely successful in practice and it is considered a state-of-the-art system which was absolutely required. The system based on a soft copy environment is very open and transparent. Every country has a focal point linked with OSCE Secretariat (it is up to the country to sort out internal arrangements among various ministries and other partners involved so that information is fed to the appointed focal point).

The decision was taken that applicant details/CVs etc are kept at the national capitals. The focal points are controlling the details, updating them etc and are then feeding the standardised information to OSCE upon request. For this reason, it is really the will of participating States that will make the REACT concept work. This leads to the problem, researched in the initial stages, whereby countries were unable to provide the required number of experts for a certain mission. A system is now in place and indicative figures are known (as proposed by the Member States themselves) of experts for a given field of expertise who can be mobilised when needed. The overall indicative figure is 2,123 experts

pledged by all the countries (575 for Civilian Police alone) and this apparently covers what would be needed rapidly at any given time.

According to OSCE the system is very good because it allows, in addition to Government staff, to tap qualified human resources from NGOs, academic institutions, senior independent experts and retired professionals. It is true that in Eastern Europe such wider outreach is still at an initial stage; until recently countries like Russia and Slovakia were almost exclusively seconding diplomats but diversification has now started. There is the need to include in special training courses also non-diplomats and civil society. It is recognized that Peace building (and related activities) is so complex and wide that there is the need to tap all kinds of fields and expertise which may be available in the society at large.

Overall, OSCE estimates that some 80% of the personnel mobilised in large missions are “free agents” who have worked with the UN System, International NGOs etc and not merely diplomats as it was the case some 10 years ago.

## **6.2 Benefits and entitlements**

Benefits and entitlements are an important cost factor for the recruiting and sending organisation. For the volunteer these are crucial factors for the attractiveness of an organisation, which should not be underestimated in a sector where organisations are competing for a limited pool of qualified and available volunteers.

One crucial aspect for ECPC is that if civilian experts will be considered as volunteers (or volunteer specialists) with a relatively low remuneration (or “soft” package of incentives) and they will most probably happen to work in complex operations alongside better paid UN staff, or other international organisations’ personnel etc (sometimes less experienced than possible ECPC staff of the level OSCE has in mind) there is a potential for problems during field operations. This has happened already in various field operations. For instance, in Rwanda, in a kind of reverse scenario where EU monitors recruited through a sub-contracting agreement with the German Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) were earning four times more than EU nationals of comparable experience working as UNVs.

Looking at the examples of two major sending organisations (UNV and US Peace Corps) the following positions have to be covered:

- Travel costs
- Pre-departure expenses
- Settling-in costs (for long-term missions)
- Daily/Monthly subsistence allowance
- Leave Allowance
- Insurance costs
- Hazardous Duty Station Supplement
- Resettlement allowance

### **UNV:**

-Travel costs (tickets) to and from the duty station.

If the specific location is considered a family duty station, the organization will cover the travel costs of up to three primary dependents (spouse and two children or three children – below 21 years of age and provided they are not gainfully employed at the time). Additional dependents may be authorized on case by case basis but travel costs will be borne by the volunteer.



-Pre-departure expenses

A standard amount of \$ 350 towards all pre-departure expenses (one-time payment for the UNV Specialist only). It covers: passport and visa costs, medicals, in-country pre-departure travel and transit costs during stopovers etc. Advances on per diem in the amount of \$ 50 per each dependent are given for stopovers and terminal expenses to be incurred by them (this applies also to the final return travel).

One way lump-sum for shipment and insurance of personal effects: \$ 500 for the volunteer (additional lump-sums are paid to recognized dependents – since it is also granted for the return travel the total possible one cost for this budget line will be \$ 4,000: 4 pax x 1,000).

-Settling-In-Grant Plus (SIGPLUS) (for assignments of more than three months)

It consists of two portions:

- a lump-sum (called Installation Portion) paid at the beginning of the assignment to help volunteers in the purchase of basic household items and to help meet initial transportation needs
- a provision for temporary accommodation upon arrival (called Temporary Accommodation Allowance).

The Temporary Accommodation Allowance consists of 15 days DSA at the prevailing UN rate for the location (using the comparatively lower 'elsewhere' rate).

The Installation Portion depends on the length of the actual assignments; some examples:

- 12 months assignment: 1.75 months of the Monthly Living Allowance (MLA) at one dependency rate
- 24 months: 3.5 months' MLA at the applicable single or dependency rate.

-Volunteer Living Allowance (VLA): it is intended to cover basic living expenses and should not be considered as a salary.

It consists of two components:

- Monthly Living Allowance (also mentioned above) at the single or dependency rates. It is a complex allowance with rates being established at UNV HQ and based on UN cost of living classification which are usually reviewed annually. It is paid on monthly basis in advance at the duty station during the first week of the month.
- Monthly Accommodation Allowance (also called Accommodation and Utility Allowance): this is meant to enable the volunteer to obtain simple and modest accommodation by the time (15 days) the Temporary Accommodation Allowance ceases to apply. It is country specific and can vary considerably from place to place. If accommodation is provided free of charge by the project, host agency, UNDP etc, 20% of VLA will be deducted.

MLA rates are currently:

- Single rate \$ 832
- Dependent \$ 1,113
- Two or more dependents \$ 1,249

Refund of insurance costs for personal property: up to \$ 75 of insurance premiums, arranged for and paid by the volunteer, can be reimbursed upon presentation of relevant receipts.

Health, Life and Personal Disability Insurance, Medical Insurance for Dependents, Medical Evacuation and Security (including Security Evacuation): Full coverage as per UN system regulations.

**Annual Leave:**

UNV Specialists are entitled to 2.5 days working days per completed month of service. Leave must be taken during the contract period and no payment in lieu of accrued leave is possible.

**Home Leave:**

This is an additional benefit for longer-term UNV Specialists – for instance they are entitled to home leave if unaccompanied at the duty station but with recognized dependents at home when they serve at least for 24 months (can be taken after 12 months provided they will complete the period).

**-Hazardous Duty Station Supplement:** If the UN Security Co-ordinator has approved hazard pay for duty station, UNV HQ will authorize payment of a supplement at the approved rate. This facility will be considered as an incentive.

**-Resettlement Allowance (RSA):**

It is intended to provide UNV Specialists with a small cash-grant to help with resettling costs in the home country. It is subject to satisfactory completion of assignment and fulfilment of obligations. It amounts to \$ 100 per month of completed service (\$ 1,200 per year).

UNV has recently undertaken a survey of conditions of service of volunteers, in close consultation with several organizations such as the U.S. Peace Corps, VSO, Canadian agencies and SIDA, and they are expecting as a result to introduce some changes to current UNV Conditions of Service which are analysed below. The complete survey report is expected by the end of 2005 and UNV will be able to apply its recommendations thereafter. A preliminary comment advanced by UNV was that UNV have found to be quite generous with the amount foreseen as Settling-In Grant at the beginning of the assignment and rather weak in terms of Resettlement Allowance paid to volunteers at the end of the assignment.

**US Peace Corps:**

The Peace Corps volunteer receive allowances during training and service. These allowances are calculated to permit them to live at the modest standards of the people they serve, while at the same time not compromising or endangering health or safety. Although volunteers may of course bring with them some personal funds, they are all the same expected to live within the allowances provided to them and therefore personally supplementing the allowances is discouraged.

Specifically, the organization does not allow trainees or volunteers to receive payment for any work done while in the Peace Corps, invest money within the host country, or engage in any other activity for personal financial gain while serving.

**-Walk-Around Allowance**

Provided at the beginning of pre-service training. It is a modest amount of pocket money given in addition to room and board.

**-Settling-In Allowance (in local currency upon arrival to the duty station)**

This covers initial in-country housekeeping needs, such as furniture and supplies. Purchases should be consistent with the modest living standards encouraged by the Peace Corps. It is generally expected that volunteers will leave the items purchased in the country when they leave service and the organization does not pay to ship these items home.

**-Living Allowance**

On a monthly basis. Sufficient to cover subsistence needs: adequate food, clothing, housing, utilities, transportation, and incidentals such as laundry, and postage. Allowances are based

on local living costs and differ from country to country and even within a country. They are subject to change depending on changes in host country living costs.

**-Leave Allowance**

Volunteers are paid two days of annual leave allowance for every month of volunteer service. Each overseas post determines whether it will pay this allowance monthly with the living allowance, quarterly, or in a lump sum prior to the scheduled vacation.

**-Post-Service Readjustment Allowance**

Volunteers are given a readjustment allowance at the end of service to facilitate their transition from Peace Corps service to the next step in their careers and lives. The allowance accrues at a rate of \$225 for each month of service and is held without interest in a readjustment allowance account. Social Security taxes are deducted from the readjustment allowance. One-third of the net amount of this allowance is available to the volunteer in-country at the end of the assignment for use en route home while the remainder will be settled later on at the home address.

No indications were given as to the actual amounts paid to the volunteers, the system is very comprehensive and figures do vary significantly from country to country and depending on the actual location in the field. Given the very limited amount of these combined allowances, volunteers usually do not have to pay income taxes (unless of course they have other personal sources of income).

**NORDEM** says that gross costs for seconded personnel is NOK 50.000 to 100.000 (app. 6,000 to 12,000 Euro) per month depending on country, position and the organisation of secondment. Some organisations, like OSCE, pay per diems, others do not, and that is influencing on the costs for the supply country. NORDEM pays nothing extra for family, children, school etc.

In Denmark the basic principle in the governments **IHB**-agency is to pay full compensation for the normal salary plus additional costs related to the posting. The costs are a bit higher than in the Norwegian NORDEM-system.

In the Netherlands remuneration for posted NGO personnel is based on standards from the Dutch Personnel Service Overseas. **Care Netherlands** which has an organisational background in working with post conflict rehabilitation, gives the information that the salary typical is app. 3.500 Euro a month plus housing, schooling etc.

The remuneration in Norway, Denmark and The Netherlands are typically based on the principle of normal salaries, and compensation for the "loss" seconded personnel have when they are posted abroad.

As regards compensation, it is estimated that the overall cost of a volunteer at International Executive Service Corp (**IESC**) on a standard 35-days assignment is about \$ 14,000; this has been calculated by adding up travel costs (deployment costs at an average of \$ 1,900), insurance –including war risk insurance- (total \$ 200-300), and overhead administrative costs (\$ 800 - \$ 1,800 depending on the specific case) plus per diem/living allowances for the volunteer which are based on the standard rates of the Department of State.

**CEELI** does not pay a stipend to volunteers but provides a support package that covers travel, housing, general living and business expenses. In-country foreign language training, medical evacuation insurance and refund for medical insurance premiums are also included.

Housing allowances and per diems for meals/incidentals are based on the Department of State rates. However, CEELI applies a standard reduction of the above rates and actually pays 75% of the established amounts (on average \$ 1500 + \$ 800 + \$ 250 for medical

insurance). When everything is added up, a typical CEELI volunteer would cost \$ 35,000-40,000 a year which is really very little compared to existing alternatives.

**ACDI/VOCA** covers all expenses connected with volunteer assignments, including pre-departure administrative expenses, medicals, transportation, local staff support, materials, supplies and interpreter costs required to carry out the assignment, as well as per diem for lodging and meals at the duty station.

The Dept. of State rates are used to determine the per diem entitlements of the volunteers (usually 70-80% of the standard rates are paid to ACDI/VOCA volunteers). Utilizing volunteers is very cost-effective if we consider that contributions of similar level of expertise from private consultants would cost up to US\$ 900-1000 a day once we include apportioned costs for travel and administrative expenses. Even when these costs are added, a volunteer assignment would cost half that amount. Moreover, if host organizations can provide lodging the reduced per diem rates are cut further.

**Citizens Development Corps (CDC)** is a non-governmental organization founded in 1989 and dedicated to promoting economic development in emerging markets and transition economies. Of particular interest to this study is a division of CDC, the MBA Enterprise Corps, established in 1990. Overall the actual cost of a 15-month volunteer assignment, including pro-rated administrative staff costs for running the programme, selection and recruitment, is \$ 55,000-70,000 (\$ 3,600-4,600 per month). A re-entry stipend (some \$ 4,000) is also foreseen.

This amount has been calculated by MBAEC having regard to the average starting salary of a business school graduate (\$ 91,000 a year). To this amount, \$ 4,000 (the re-entry stipend) are deducted and USAID approves the resulting amount for volunteer of \$ 87,000. The balance remaining to MBAEC goes towards covering other operational and programme costs.

MBAEC works with sub-budgets per country and therefore if there are more volunteers per country the overall costs are considerably reduced. With more than four volunteers in a country, MBAEC appoints a Country Director. Most of the time he/she is (to save costs) a locally recruited expatriate who speaks well the local language or a local expert.

### **6.3 Training**

Training for a volunteer can be either mission specific (country background, local language, local political situation) or in general skills (conflict resolution skills, communication, security training, etc.). The training can be prior to a mission or a general training course offered to members of a data base for example. All models are practiced in various forms. This short section describes general examples of volunteer and recruiting organisations in Europe and in the US. A later section will deal with training specifically for civilian crisis management.

At **UNV** in addition to in-country briefing and orientation programmes (7-10 days), 2-3 days administrative briefings may be, if necessary, authorized in a regional office prior to arrival. Also, UNDP may authorize in-country training in the local language if this is appropriate and necessary for performing the assignment (it should not exceed \$ 500 per year). If some kind of technical training is required it will be covered by the specific project.

At the **US Peace Corps** substantial training is given in the local language of the specific community living where the volunteer is going to work; this takes place before starting actual operational work and a basic language local test is foreseen. The training imparted to Peace Corps has been recently recognized as a model by other organizations.

By the end of training a trainee must demonstrate competence in the language of the country of service, proficiency in the technical skills needed to carry out the assignment, and adequate knowledge of the culture and history of the country of assignment.

Once the applications are accepted, the organization makes arrangements for so-called staging events where applicants officially submit their registration forms and become Peace Corps trainees. The staging event consists of 12 hours of orientation and training and trainees do receive the necessary immunizations and prepare for departure to the country of service. Staging is a precursor to the 8-12 weeks of pre-service training (PST) that occurs in the country or geographic region of assignment.

**ZIF** organises two week training courses for civilians. This includes security training; inter cultural communication and much more (details on the web site<sup>14</sup>). ZIF is an active member in the European Group for Training, which organises the training of civilian aspects of conflict management. With Austria (first coordinator of the group) and Sweden (present coordinator), ZIF is one of the most active partners and contributes with trainings in rule of law and mission support. The group is finance by EuropeAid but the content and coordination is done by the Member States.

Participants are nominated by the Member States. After the training there is no central data base or follow up for participants. Trained participants just go back into “their” national rosters. There is no link between the training and the recruitment. At ZIF the training is used for human resource development: candidates with a high potential are recommended for the training.

Training and an active training agenda is an essential part of the work of **Peaceworkers UK**, and training offers are concentrated on the people which Peaceworkers UK “want to put forward”. The experience is that training courses need to be of a few days duration only. The longest course arranged has been for two weeks, but intensive weekend courses including what is called “assessment weekends” of 1½ days are very popular and efficient not least in for people already with seniority and experience.

## **6.4 Mission support**

Each deployment must rely on structures in the field: see the example of OSCE missions, see UN missions, and see EU missions. UNV for example has field officers who support their field staff but the mission itself is implemented by local structures. For organisations that do not have structures available and set up exclusively for the support of volunteers, a question of the absorption capacity arises. Organisations have to ask how many external experts can be absorbed by a structure that has many other tasks to perform and which operates in complex and insecure environments.

Mission support is very important to existing sending organisations. The importance starts with logistics and security but goes for beyond. A recent study about intercultural aspects of missions showed that international experts have fewer problems in working with local staff but more within the international teams (ethical questions, time management, etc). This is why mission support becomes so important.

At **UNV** full mission support is provided by the UNDP Country Office. There is always a UNV unit within the UNDP office. It is usually manned by a UNV Programme Officer (who is a UNV Specialist himself/herself with a programming role of supervising the projects where UNVs have been placed) and by a UNV Country Operations Assistant (national staff) with administrative functions. Many tasks have been facilitated by IT in recent years and, for

---

<sup>14</sup> [www.zif-berlin.org](http://www.zif-berlin.org)

instance, Performance Review is now carried out online between UNVs and Supervisors at the UNDP Country Office.

**US Peace Corps** has a very large structure at Headquarters and in the home country to manage and support operations in the field, Out of the yearly USPC's budget, US\$ 270 million are for Direct Volunteer Operations and \$ 74 million for Volunteer Support Services.

Support to field operations is provided through the establishment of Posts in the capitals (in addition to support provided by the Embassy) headed by a very senior Country Director. As a minimum, Posts will be manned by a Country Director and one Administration Officer (both American nationals) and the necessary local staff (trainers, project monitors, drivers, maintenance staff etc). For example the newly established Post in Mexico has altogether 19 staff while a very large Post such as those in Ghana and Nicaragua may have up to 200 staff each.

Safety and security of personnel plays an important part (US\$ 2 millions for 2006) of Peace Corps HQ' support to operations in the field. The recently established Office of Safety and Security, in coordination with post-level and regional safety and security personnel, provides for a safety and security framework for volunteers. This involves training in how to maintain one's safety while serving in a foreign country as well as assistance in addressing any safety related issues.

An important point stressed by the Peace Corps is to minimize risks by ensuring that the volunteer is well-known, accepted, and integrated into his or her community at the duty station. This is achieved by learning the local language, the culture, working in well designed projects, and staying close to host families.

At any rate, very comprehensive policies and regulations have been designed and necessary actions budgeted for (including for evacuations) in terms of safety and security. The Peace Corps addresses main security concerns through country-specific emergency action plans (EAPs). These plans, developed to address natural disasters, political unrest, serious accidents, and the like, set forth the strategies developed by each country to prepare for, respond to, and recover from such crises. EAPs are handed over to the volunteer at the orientation during pre-service training and at subsequent in-service trainings. The volunteer is expected to familiarize himself with the plan and his role and responsibilities during times of crisis.

At **IESC** in recent times more volunteers are integrated in larger programmes by country with a basic structure consisting of a competent Chief of Party, a Deputy Chief of Party, the required number of volunteers with specific individual expertise and sufficient local staff.

**CEELI** has in each country a professional Country Representative (they are not volunteers), the required number of legal volunteers seconded to the projects for periods of 2 weeks to 2 years, and local staff (lawyers and support staff). In addition to the countries with fully fledged offices, CEELI may also be engaged or active in other countries (15 in Africa, Asia and Latin America) through American Bar Association (ABA) offices.

As far as security is concerned, all volunteers are registered with the US Embassy and all appropriate security measures are in place. Volunteers can be evacuated if necessary; this is a rare occurrence, although recently volunteers in Uzbekistan have been relocated to another country in the region. At times of crisis, former MBAs in the country also step in and help them in many ways.

For **ACDI/VOCA** regarding mission support, there are almost always ACDI/VOCA offices in countries with active projects.

## **6.5 Local ownership and local partners**

The issue of mission support can be closely linked to local ownership and local partners. The choice to work with local partners can solve the problem of providing mission support through own structures in the target countries. The decision to work through local partners goes in line with continuing trends in development, conflict resolution and humanitarian aid to reduce international presence and instead enforce local capacity. Cooperation with locally based capacities can include all phases of the cycle of a volunteer programme. It can start as early as in the recruitment stage. As shown above many of the existing organisations recruit volunteers in the target countries. This concept assures local ownership and sustainability.

**WSP International**, a Swiss-based independent peace-building organization, is considered by the UN as a leading institution in the peace-building field, with a unique methodology which calls for local actors to play the main role within affected societies in order to overcome conflict and build lasting peace.

The key principles of its peace-building approach are national ownership, full participation of key socio-political actors across the local society, conflict-sensitive participatory research and the establishment of trusted and capable local partner institutions that will eventually act as partner institutions to bilateral and multilateral institutions to assist them in carrying out their mandates in conflict prevention, rehabilitation and the consolidation of peace.

The structure of a **Geekcorps** field office consists of a Programme Coordinator (usually an international volunteer or paid consultant with considerable experience in the country), some international volunteers and as many national volunteers as required by the specific project. It is a predominant concern of all Geekcorps initiatives to adapt western technology to local conditions, to involve local entities and volunteers at the maximum level and to ensure full ownership of project activities by and capacity building of local beneficiaries to enable them manage the systems established once the project is completed.

Recruitment takes place through **CEELI's** Liaison and Legal Specialist Program. Attorneys, judges and law professors work in host countries with local partners on projects rooted in a spirit of long-term trust and cooperation. Liaisons work closely with members of the local legal community to develop and carry out legal assistance projects that are tailored to meet the needs of that country.

## **6.6 Budget and range**

**US Peace Corps** has a very large structure at Headquarters and in the home country to manage and support operations in the field. The Peace Corps are deploying some 7,500 volunteers per year (7,733 in 2004). The proposed budget request for 2006 is of US\$ 345 million. The magnitude of the organization can be clearly expressed, for instance, by the yearly allotment for Volunteer Selection and Recruitment amounting to over US\$ 15 million.

**ZIF** has 20 employees of which 5 are working in the recruitment department, 5 in the training department, 5 in the analysis department and 5 for administration. The yearly budget of ZIF is 2 Mio Euro. ZIF maintains 850 profiles in their roster. The profiles are mainly from the core areas such as: good governance, human rights, civil affairs, legal sector and some humanitarian areas (child protection, disarmament, etc.).

ZIF also becomes active in the search for individuals in the market when the UN or the OSCE sends requests. ZIF does lobbying for missions and does promotion for their recruitment in various forms. Today there are about 200 civilians in missions of whom 50% are in OSCE missions, 30% in UN missions and 20% in EU missions.

Since **Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative's** (CEELI) founding in 1990, over 5,000 judges attorneys and law professors have contributed over \$ 180 million of pro bono time as legal volunteers in 28 countries for the various CEELI projects, CEELI funding for Fiscal Year 2003 was \$ 19,169,313 (almost \$ 15 million from USAID).

The **Volunteers for Prosperity** (VfP) is the most recent US initiative (approved in September 2003) under which skilled volunteers can be deployed in official U.S. foreign assistance programs. It forms part of the USA Freedom Corps - an office of the White House - which were set up in 2002. Some 200 organizations (both non- or for profit), representing a pool of at least 34,000 skilled professionals, have entered into agreements with VfP. These organizations are collectively capable to deploy 4,000 - 8,000 volunteers per year. The USAID Office of Volunteers for Prosperity is a relatively light structure manned by three full-time professionals: Director, Senior Policy Advisor and Program Specialist.

## **6.7 Possible cooperation with ECPC**

**PeaceWorkers UK's** register is open for other users. The use of the register will be based on contractual agreements with possible clients. Peaceworkers UK works with the different European peace networks, including the organisations and institutions in EPLO. There will be a partnership agreement with Forum ZFD in Germany and other similar relevant NGO's in other EU-countries. Agreements and partnership will be based on common quality standards for recruitment.

Peaceworkers UK see as a natural development and fully within the ideas of the Peaceworkers register that it can operate with EU for the development of ECPC. Peaceworkers UK could be a national focal point but could also cover a number of other countries and areas within the European peace-network.

The Peaceworkers register will also be used as a recruitment agency for relevant clients working with conflict related activities. Different principles of payment have been agreed with different clients.

- 1) A client who includes a candidate in the clients own roster pays a fee of 500 British Pounds. Another 500 Pounds are paid if and when the candidate is deployed.
- 2) When the register supplies candidates for a co operating NGO's the normal recruitment fee is 20 – 25 % of the first annual fee.
- 3) It is possible for partners working continuously with the Peaceworkers register to agree on a flat annual rate. Nonviolent Peaceforce pays 20.000 dollars a year to be able to use the register. The fee is calculated as 50 % of a staff salary.

The drawing up of an inventory of state-of-the-art capacities of organizations operating in this field would be very important. Conflict prevention and post-conflict recovery are so broad concepts and encompass so many categories of interventions that is very difficult to know exactly who is doing what and at what level of specialization.

It would be therefore relatively easy for the EU to identify and then enter into framework contracts with those organizations that are really specialized in this area (such as WSP-International) and utilize their methodology in conflict affected countries for driving the peace process, rebuilding trust in the reconciliation process etc. As an example, WSP has been funded by the EU in Somalia where it is most active with projects in Somaliland, Puntland and the Central and Southern Regions.



**CEELI** is very keen on working in close cooperation with the European Commission and to provide its services and expertise (i.e. volunteers) for EU projects and endeavours if suitable mechanisms and agreements can be devised and put into effect.

However impartiality and neutrality are an issue to be considered. For **ICRC** the importance of distinguishing themselves in implementing activities was clearly stressed. It is essential that the perceptions in the operational environment by the people in the affected country are absolutely clear in this regard. Distinction should be clearly maintained between actors with a pure humanitarian agenda and political agendas. This makes the option of working together with a fully structured ECPC (a force with direct operational capability) very difficult. There could be problems (this has happened in the past) if personnel working for ECPC would then work for ICRC in the same location, or vice versa, because the above-mentioned distinction could not be fully maintained.

## ***6.8 Other experiences and examples***

### ***Online Volunteers***

A relatively recent initiative, which has already outgrown early expectations, is the establishment of Online Volunteers. As of 2004, more than 12,000 individuals worldwide have offered to provide services from home. UNV manages the Online Volunteering service to match the supply of skills and knowledge of registered volunteers with the demand of hundreds of organizations that request them. This initiative has an enormous potential and it is seen as the perfect channel for people who want to volunteer and share their skills but can't take time off their regular work, be away from their families or other commitments. Actual services provided online from home range from project reporting and technical support in project implementation to distance learning for women and assistance in project evaluation.

### ***UNV interns***

UNV interns usually receive 80% of the MLA given to UNV International Specialists. Much of their entitlements depend on the specific agreements signed with their respective governments. The UNV Internship Programme is usually open to young graduates (less than 26 years of age) and respond to certain criteria which may vary depending on the specific UNV/Government agreement. The Programme financed by Italy, for instance, is drawn up in collaboration with UNV HQ and the Office of Human Resources for International Cooperation of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs and foresees the placement of successful candidates (20 per year) as UNVs working in projects of various UN agencies in the following main areas of interest: governance, gender, information and communication technology, micro-enterprises, poverty reduction and sustainable development.

### ***US Peace Corps and Crisis Corps***

The US Crisis Corps is a unique Peace Corps program that utilizes more experienced volunteers such as RPCVs (i.e. Peace Corps volunteers who have reapplied and served for a second term) and volunteers at their close of service to help countries in some areas, including recovery from natural disasters and humanitarian crises.

The program was formally established in 1996 and more than 500 volunteers were placed in 32 countries in its first seven years. Assignments typically range from three to six months, and volunteers are generally placed with national or international governmental or non-governmental organizations engaged in reconstruction and development activities.

With an extensive database of interested and available RPCVs and volunteers at their close of service, the Crisis Corps can place more experienced personnel with the technical, cultural, and language skills necessary to make an impact in critical situations. To serve as a Crisis Corps Volunteer, an applicant must have successfully completed two years as a Peace Corps Volunteer. In some cases the assignments are contiguous, in other cases former Peace Corps join as Crisis Corps 10 or 20 years later bringing in considerable additional expertise.

Crisis Corps have served in a wide variety of assignments: working with refugees and IDPs; assisting countries after earthquakes, cyclones, and hurricanes in the areas of water sanitation, housing reconstruction, and health education; providing training to communities in disaster preparedness and mitigation; in the HIV/AIDS program and working with countries in their post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

Crisis Corps Volunteers generally receive the same benefits as Peace Corps Volunteers with just minor exceptions relating to the shorter term nature of their assignments.

### ***Lessons learnt from the OSCE Monitor Mission to Skopje in 2001***

A number of recommendations were made as a result of the lessons learnt from the OSCE Monitor Mission to Skopje. Some are particularly relevant to the purpose of this study and would enable, if implemented, further progress beyond the already positive application of the REACT concept for this crisis:

- There is a requirement to develop and maintain a roster of admin experts that can be called upon to deploy immediately when needed. They should have experience with OSCE or the UN, should be identified externally, should be available at short notice and be prepared to serve in any new mission for at least 3 months.
- Development of a generic logistics plan that focuses on the planning phase of a mission start-up to be used as a template for the mission support aspects of future operations.
- Development of a generic handbook with updated standard technical instructions and operational directives, in standardised formats, as a Start-up Kit for new missions. In general, development of unified working procedures and standards in all missions. A dedicated Security Officer to be included in the personnel establishment for any new mission where there is an identified security risk to mission members.
- Depending on the threat, availability before deployment of personal protective security aids, such as specialised vehicles if necessary, for use by mission members.
- Inclusion of an experienced doctor (or nurse) in the personnel establishment of such missions.
- Experts in police training should be included at the very early stage during planning , in order to conduct a Training Needs Assessment in the new mission

## **6.9 Conclusions**

There are two key criteria essential for the **targeting** of potential volunteers: qualification and readiness to leave (on short notice, or to countries with difficult environments). In the field of civilian crisis management there is only a limited pool of experts fulfilling the demanded criteria and many organisations compete for the same people.

Two factors contribute to a successful **identification** and **recruitment** of experts. The first is the employment of recruitment experts in the recruiting organisation. Ideally these experts should be conflict professionals as well or at least cooperate closely with qualified staff. The second is the necessity of being present on a local level and having knowledge about the local recruitment market.

IT based solutions open wide possibilities for the **management of a roster** for volunteers/experts. However an active roster management and a good knowledge of the area and the candidates are essential to assure quality and effectiveness in recruiting. A roster with about 500 to 2000 candidates is seen as ideal.

Many reasons count for a **decentralized** management of a roster, involving national or regional focal points, which are integrated fully into the system. Successful examples exist on national and international level.

**Benefits and entitlements** are important factors for the recruiting and sending organisation. Also for the volunteer, these are crucial factors for the attractiveness of an organisation. This should not be underestimated in a sector where organisations are competing for a limited pool of qualified and available volunteers. Most 'volunteer organisations' pay compensations, which cover the actual costs but which do not allow the volunteer to earn any money during the assignment. One crucial aspect for ECPC is that if civilian experts will be considered as volunteers (or volunteer specialists) with a relatively low remuneration (or "soft" package of incentives) and will work in complex operations alongside better paid UN staff or other international organisation personnel –who might be sometimes less experienced than possible ECPC staff - there is a potential for considerable team conflicts on the ground.

The duration of **training** provided by the agencies varies from two days to three weeks. It is mainly depending on the fact whether volunteers are deployed on a long- or short-term mission. This has also an influence on the content of the training (e.g. learning of local language, learning of the local context). Most of the training courses are general nature. Ideally the training is linked to the recruitment and the management of the roster so that the agency can contribute to the development of the profile of their candidates.

**Mission support** is crucial for the successful deployment of volunteers. An efficient locally based structure needs to be in place including well informed and proper equipped staff. This can either be a representation of the sending organisation (in the case of the EU: its delegations) or the structure of a receiving organisation (UN, OSCE, NGO, local partner).

The question of mission support goes in line with the need to work with **local structures** and to seek **local ownership**. The integration of local resources into the operations will contribute to the sustainability of activities.

Some recruitment agencies work with large **structures** and deploy thousands of volunteers per year. But already with the right network and structure, and with a team of 3-5 full time staff and a yearly budget of 2 million Euro it is possible for a non-state organisation to recruit and deploy from 200 up to 4000 volunteers per year.

ECPC could be based on a network of capable and most relevant network partners in Member States. Some organisations are very open for **cooperation** and could be involved into the planning process.

## **7. Other EU volunteer concepts/recruitment mechanisms and possible links to ECPC**

This chapter looks at existing EU volunteer concepts and other recruitment mechanisms of the EU to look out for possible linkages and to learn about their experiences and practices.

The study team had a look at the following instruments:

- European Voluntary Service
- European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps
- Individual Experts Roster
- Election Observer Roster
- Relex Contract Agents
- Junior Experts in Delegation Programme

The European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps and the Relex Contracts Agents are not yet in place so that no direct lessons learned can be taken at this stage. Nevertheless it is suggested to look at their range and set up so that potentials for future linkages can be identified.

The lessons learned from EVS and the JED Programme will concentrate only on to the most relevant issues for ECPC. The JED Programme and the Relex Contract Agents are not volunteer programmes as participants get a salary for the entire duration of the post.

### **7.1 European Voluntary Service-EVS**

#### *Description of EVS*

DG Education and Culture operates – as part of the EU YOUTH programme (2000-2006) - an important instrument to channel international solidarity of young people in Europe and in a number of partner countries: the European Voluntary Service (EVS).

The European Voluntary Service allows young people to carry out an unpaid voluntary service abroad<sup>15</sup>. Currently approx. 3.500 volunteers participate in EVS each year. Under the “Europe-wide” strand of EVS, projects with many partners and up to 60 volunteers in different individual placements in different countries can be implemented. The primary aims of EVS are to enhance the solidarity of young people, their personal development and active citizenship and to strengthen their European awareness. EVS unfolds in a variety of domains and project formats, which always contain important service and learning elements.

Group short-term projects are possible to accommodate the needs of young volunteers with fewer opportunities. However, collective EVS formats generally remain an exception. The Commission sees a strong potential in collective EVS projects to strengthen the solidarity effectiveness, the impact and visibility of EVS, while maintaining the emphasis on personal development. Therefore, the Commission has the intention, after some experimental projects in the recent months and years, to considerably extend the possibility for collective voluntary service. In 2005, EVS is open for projects in the area of culture, sports, youth and civil protection. Under the new “Youth in Action” programme (2007-2013) a large-scale extension of EVS with up to 10.000 volunteers per year (approx. 4000 of them under collective EVS) is envisaged.

---

<sup>15</sup> Action 2 of the EU YOUTH programme (2000-2006)

### *Linkages to ECPC*

The present process of rethinking about EVS range and structure of activities could bear a potential for linking the service with a possible ECPC. However, EVS is addressing a different target group of volunteers than the ECPC should do. EVS is addressing young people with an age between 18 and 25 years (maybe up to 30 in the future). These volunteers are mainly inexperienced and do not have the qualification to work in peace building or conflict resolution. This is clearly defined by EVS:

“Concerning possible contributions of young volunteers to international solidarity, it is important to emphasise that young volunteers must not and cannot replace professional emergency or humanitarian aid workers in crisis situations nor in their immediate aftermath. The young age and lack of experience of volunteers would not allow for an effective contribution in these situations, would even hinder professional help and would expose the young volunteers to high risks for health and life.”<sup>16</sup>

Given the fact that the primary objective of EVS is the personal development of volunteers the service should not be linked to ECPC in the initial stage. Nevertheless, EVS has a potential for a link in post-crisis situations, which is also acknowledged by EVS:

“Instead, young volunteers could effectively contribute with less immediate and more structural and long-term tasks in post-crisis situations and development aid. Potential areas could be: rehabilitation of the environment and infrastructure, education/youth/children, health, civil protection, etc. These tasks would also ensure a higher sustainability of the solidarity action, especially when implemented in partnership with the local population and competent partners of civil society, other international organisations (e.g. United Nations Volunteers) etc.”<sup>17</sup>

This potential should be acknowledged and used for EU purposes in civilian crisis management. Young EU volunteers could enter into a network of potential candidates for volunteers/experts under the framework of ECPC. Young EU citizens would stay in contact with the EU services after the period spent as European Volunteer. Their acquired country experience and knowledge of local structures and languages could be used to built upon for civilian crisis managers under the EU solidarity concept. Together with their ongoing education and the acquiring of additional skills these volunteers would well qualified professionals for ECPC. This vision could be seen as a life-long affiliation of EU citizens to the EU, starting with an assignment under EVS, followed by ongoing training in EU training programmes and leading into assignments as senior experts in ECPC or other EU programmes.

### *Lessons learned from EVS*

The most important lesson learned from EVS is the management structure of the programme. The 30 million Euro programme works with a decentralised structure. Youth agencies in 32 European countries are in charge of 90% of the exchange programme budget. Projects and participants are selected through national agencies through calls for proposals. The system of focal points in participating countries assures an active exchange under the guidance of the centrally based EU office in Brussels.

---

<sup>16</sup> Position of DG Education and Culture on young volunteers in international solidarity; Brussels, 16 March 2005 EAC/D2/JM D 4239 (2005)

<sup>17</sup> Position of DG Education and Culture on young volunteers in international solidarity; Brussels, 16 March 2005 EAC/D2/JM D 4239 (2005)

Crucial for recruitment of volunteers and the implementation of the volunteer programme are the organisations involved. The programme includes so called *sending* and so called *hosting* organisations. An umbrella organisation which coordinates the work of a number of sending or host organisations in a country within a network is known as a national or regional "coordinating organisation". A coordinating organisation may have a considerable amount of voluntary work experience and belong to an efficient network, either at national, European or international level. Its responsibilities may vary depending on the agreements it has concluded with the sending or host organisations. Its primary role is to form relationships with host organisations, and to coordinate, prepare and offer support to the volunteers it places in these organisations.

It undertakes to carry out all or some of the host or sending organisations' administrative tasks. The budget item *Contribution to the host activities* or *Contribution to the sending activities* is then shared between the host, sending and coordinating organisations, according to the division of tasks and in agreement between the partners. The coordinating organisation is principally responsible for ensuring that EVS philosophy and rules are complied with. It also has to provide training for volunteers or ensure they attend the training sessions organised by the National Agencies.

Any type of non-governmental organisation, an association, a local authority or any other non-profit-making local initiative can be a "*sending organisation*". For a sending organisation, EVS offers an opportunity to establish a cooperation and to exchange experience with a partner in a Programme country. The sending organisation is responsible for arranging the following:

- Preparation  
The preparation required includes helping the volunteer to find and contact a host organisation. In addition, volunteers need to be prepared for their stay abroad according to their individual needs (including possible visa requirements etc.). The sending organisation is obliged to make sure that the volunteer attends a pre-departure training session.
- Contact during voluntary service  
The sending organisation should keep in contact with the volunteer and with the host organisation during the project in order to avoid crises. It will also help organise follow-up after the volunteer's return.
- Follow-up  
Volunteers should receive help with reintegrating into their home community. The sending organisation should give volunteers an opportunity to exchange and share their experiences and must also support them, e.g. by providing information about other possibilities within the YOUTH programme (especially Action 3 - Future Capital) and by helping them into further education, training or employment.
- Visa and insurance  
The sending organisation has a shared responsibility with the host organisation to arrange a visa for the volunteer. It is also the responsibility of the sending organisation to make sure that the volunteer's contact details are sent to the insurance company contracted by the European Commission.

The basis for ECPC is the existence of a number of institutions where volunteers can do their voluntary service. These are called "*host organisations*". European Voluntary Service brings together a large number of different organisations, projects, local authorities and other initiatives. Their contribution to EVS is essential. By welcoming a volunteer, a host organisation brings new ideas and intercultural elements into its regular activities. It could also have an interesting exchange of experience with the sending organisation through the volunteer. Any type of non-governmental organisation, an association, a local authority or any other non-profit-making local initiative can be a host organisation.

The host organisation is responsible for arranging the following:

- Task-related support  
Volunteers' tasks should reflect their individual abilities and desires. Persons who are familiar with those tasks should guide them. The host organisation is also responsible for sending the volunteer to the mid-term meeting.
- Personal support  
To avoid and overcome any difficulties, either in volunteers' personal lives or in their activities in the host organisation, sufficient personal support should be provided for volunteers. They should be given opportunities to integrate into the local community, to meet other young people, to socialise, to participate in leisure activities, etc. Contacts with other EVS volunteers should be encouraged whenever possible.
- Accommodation  
The host organisation has to provide suitable accommodation for the volunteer.
- Food  
The host organisation is responsible for providing meals, or a food allowance, for the volunteer.
- Local transport  
The host organisation must provide means of local transport for the volunteer.
- Allowance  
The host organisation must pay an allowance to the volunteer on a weekly or monthly basis (the amount is included in the grant from the YOUTH programme).
- Visa  
The host organisation has a shared responsibility with the sending organisation to arrange a visa for the volunteer.
- Language training (should not be needed for ECPC, but translation)  
Language skills have long-term benefits in addition to helping the volunteer to integrate into the host culture. The host organisation is responsible for arranging language learning opportunities.
- Mentor (not relevant for ECPC)  
Each host organisation must identify a mentor who is directly responsible for training, personal support and language training for the volunteer and to whom the volunteer can turn in case of problems. The mentor should not be the volunteer's supervisor or another person involved in the volunteer's project.

As the development of the volunteer is in the centre of EVS training plays an important role in each assignment. It is the responsibility of the National Agencies to ensure that volunteers receive adequate pre-departure and on-arrival training and attend mid-term evaluation meetings. All volunteers must participate in these training sessions.

Finally insurance related administrative issues are of interest for ECPC. Through an agreement that the European Commission has concluded with an appointed insurance company, all volunteers participating in the programme are insured against illness, accident, death, permanent disability and repatriation in case of serious illness or accident. This insurance also covers civil liability and the loss of identification and travel documents and complements the protection provided by national social security systems (if applicable) by virtue of the E 111 (or similar) form issued to the volunteer.

### *Conclusion*

The EVS should be clearly separated from ECPC. In case the service is extended –as planned at present- and a closer relation to conflict (humanitarian aid, civil protection) and the ECPC relevant age group (above 25 years) is established, the possibilities for linkages should be examined further.

Already today the structure of EVS could be a possible model for a decentralised ECPC structure with agencies in EU Member States and potential partner organisations in receiving states. It has to be understood that in EVS organisations can be “sending” and “receiving” organisations at the same time. This could be in the case of ECPC for example NGOs active in peace building who are operating worldwide with offices in EU Member States and in third countries.

## **7.2 European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps - EVHAC**

### *Description of EVHAC*

In Section 3 of Chapter IV “Cooperation with third Countries and Humanitarian Aid” of the draft EU Constitution, is pronounced the decision to set up a European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps (EVHAC). It is explicitly stated that the objective is to have a framework for contributions from young Europeans to the Humanitarian Aid operations of the Union. As volunteerism is a long established feature of humanitarianism ECHO has since its creation funded expatriate personnel working as volunteers both with international NGOs, the Red Cross and with UN bodies. ECHO has also sought to promote the professionalism of humanitarian aid through funding of a post-graduate university programme called NOHA and provided grants for a number of other training initiatives. The Constitutional requirement clearly foresaw a more formal and more identifiable European corps of volunteers.

ECHO after initial reflections thought about a three steps process for EVHAC: 1) training of a non-technical nature, e.g. in codes of conduct, personal security training, how to drive a 4x4, radio communications, and others; 2) a traineeship of six to twelve months at one or more of ECHO’s partners; and 3) a certification following successful completion with entry into a database constituting a roster, structured by knowledge of languages, professional skills, availability for short or long missions etc, to be drawn upon in responding to crises.

To develop these ideas further ECHO has asked for a study to investigate into the feasibility of such a volunteer corps. After the failed ratification process of the EU Constitution the future of EVHAC is at question. The evaluation team had the possibility to exchange with the team of consultants that is responsible for the above-mentioned feasibility study. As the ECHO study was still at an early stage this exchange was limited to a general level without the possibility to discuss detailed findings or specific overlapping of suggested solutions and proposed structures.

### *Linkages to ECPC*

What can be said at this stage is that ECPC and EVHAC first of all address different fields. Despite close relations between conflicts and humanitarian aid the two volunteer concepts must be separated clearly for two main reasons. First ECHO’s core mandate is different from ECPC area of activity. Secondly, the objective of EVHAC differs from ECPC’s aim and approach.

ECHO’s core mandate is to provide assistance in humanitarian disasters. This is understood as ad hoc assistance and relief and protection for people in third countries who are victims of natural or man-made disasters, in order to meet the humanitarian needs resulting from these different situations. ECPC on the other hand deals man-made disasters and concerns peace building, crisis management and crisis prevention. There are linkages when it comes to man made disasters, meaning crisis situation arising from war, rebellions and threats to civilians. Other linkages come from a more conflict sensitive approach in international aid. In the last years aid professionals have started to link humanitarian aid and conflicts. Based on concepts such as “Do no harm” developed by Mary Anderson the aid community today follows an aid sensitive approach in development and humanitarian assistance. Certain



governments streamline all their external assistance and follow a conflict aware approach to address conflicts and avoid fuelling crisis situations through international interventions.

The EVHAC addresses young volunteers, which leads to the same conclusion and exclusions as formulated above under EVS. Young volunteers are not targeted under ECPC and it is not ECPC's aim to contribute to the development of responsible and open EU citizens. The concept of ECPC depends on qualified professionals who can be sent in the name of the EU to conflict situations and diplomatic sensitive environments. Another reason for a clear separation derives from the fact that humanitarian assistance has to be impartial and neutral. This is common sense among humanitarian actors and also applied by ECHO and its implementing partners. Contrary, for activities under ECPC it will not always be possible to maintain impartiality and neutrality.

### *Conclusion*

At the moment it is difficult to talk about possible linkages between ECPC and EVHAC. Both concepts are in an initial stage and after the Constitution fell through the future of EVHAC is quite uncertain.

In any case ECPC and EVHAC should be clearly separated. Once both concepts are in place and first experiences are made, the EU should start a reflection process about possible linkages and synergies. Joint training in common fields, such as conflict resolution skills, could be an option. In case EVHAC will work with young volunteers again the vision of a life-long relation of volunteers with EU services could be developed further.

## **7.3 Individual Experts Roster**

### Description of Individual Experts Roster

For five years the Commission has run a data base for individual experts. This service is called "Individual experts for technical assistance to third countries in the context of the European Community's external cooperation".

For the purposes of the European Community's external cooperation, the European Commission recruits experts prepared to carry out technical assistance missions in selected specialist areas. These missions cover various areas, including food aid/food security and humanitarian aid operations. With relevance for ECPC is in particular the area Democracy and Human Rights.

These missions are integrated into the project/programme cycle of EU programmes and can be related to all stages of the cycle: programming and project design, identification, appraisal, implementation, monitoring, audit and evaluation. Experts work in third countries outside the European Union within national administrations or public or semi-public bodies of third countries benefiting from Community cooperation or in the European Commission's delegations. The missions to be performed are of extended duration: from a minimum of 12 months to a maximum of six years.

About 50% of the missions were so called "*intra muros*" missions, meaning that Experts were serving within the Delegations and working within the Commission structure. Experts who performed missions "*extra muros*" were integrated in national authorities in beneficiary countries.

Criteria for Individual Experts are very restrictive and included the following key elements:

- higher education diploma (degree or masters level) or secondary school leaving certificate;

- minimum of three years' professional experience in chosen areas or sub-areas, including at least two years outside the European Union and other industrialised countries;
- be proficient in at least one of the following three languages: English, French or Spanish.
- less than 65 years of age
- nationals of countries eligible for Community projects and programmes.

#### Linkages to ECPC

At the end of June 2005 as part of the administrative and financial reform of the EU and the adaptation of new regulations the Commission announced the phasing out of this service. The files of all candidates who are registered at present in the database for Individual Experts will be retained in the database until the end of April 2006. After that data, the details of experts in areas and sub-areas related to humanitarian aid and specifically listed will be deleted. It will therefore not be possible to link ECPC to this service.

Only the areas related to humanitarian aid, which is managed by DG ECHO were excluded from this phasing out. These areas are in particular:

- Rural development/Food security
- Environment and in particular Prevention of natural disasters
- Social development and in particular rehabilitation and Linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD)
- Education and Training
- Health
- Humanitarian and Relief Operations
- Finance

Each area has respective sub-areas. Only sub-areas which are related to humanitarian aid are maintained for recruitment under this mechanism.

As from 30 June 2005, technical assistance missions to third countries, so called 'extra muros', must be the subject of service contracts in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in the new Financial Regulations. Missions "intra muros" will be exclusively under the system of Agent Contracts and recruitment will be done through the Commission's European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO)<sup>18</sup>.

#### *Lessons learned from the Individual Experts Roster*

The fact that the Commission has managed a roster for Individual Experts for more than four years has a potential for lessons learned on organisational, administrative and cost issues. Most relevant for a possible ECPC roster are here the recruitment process, the management of the roster, and the deployment and contractual issues.

#### Recruitment and management of roster

The recruitment had been organised in the form of a call for applications. Candidates were asked to apply online and had to attach their CV to the completed application form. The CV had to be no longer than three pages with no more than three pages of annexes. The application included a declaration about qualification and availability for missions.

Selected candidates have been registered in the database. Individual Experts were mainly requested by the EU Delegations, who chose to demand Experts on the basis of the list of specialist areas. The list of selected experts has been used according to technical assistance needs and depending on the availability and technical and professional capacities (experience and training) of experts, after their suitability has been assessed in the light of the specific requirements of each mission. The Commission then decided to contact –in an

---

<sup>18</sup> See section *Call for Expression of Interest RELEX*

ideal case 5-20 Experts- registered in the roster and eligible for the requested task. In many cases a lower number of experts matched the criteria for the requested tasks or contacted Experts were not available in the requested time period. On average only 2-3 Experts out of 20 contacted Experts were available in the requested time period. This has led in certain cases to the fact that the Commission had to select candidates who were not the first choice according to their profile.

The recruitment process lasted on average 3 months. A selection could last up to 6 months in certain cases. In one case it was possible to recruit an Expert for an assignment with DG ECHO within 3 weeks.

The starting date of the services required may have been notified at short notice ranging from a few weeks to three months.

Experts included on the list have been asked to update their CVs annually on their own initiative or their names will be expunged from the list after two years. The Commission has asked to be notified of any change of address or extended (over 12 months) periods of non-availability.

The Unit responsible for the roster for Individual Experts comprised 30 persons and managed about 300 contracts at the same time. About 75 of the missions were for DG ECHO. The Unit received about 400 online applications per month. The database included about 10.000 individual profiles although a significant number were re-applications and therefore double registrations (about 2000 estimated). Candidates often did not keep their registration codes, which were necessary to update the profile online. They therefore re-registered with their updated profile and were then registered twice (three times, four times). Those double registrations could not –for competition rules – be deleted without the agreement of the Expert. The database has been managed by one person working full-time.

Deployment and contractual arrangements

The assignment of missions gives rise to direct employment contracts between the Commission and the experts, if necessary ('extra muros' assignments) after they have been approved by the beneficiaries (third country authorities). These contracts are of variable duration. They could, if necessary, be renewed once only for one mission.

Experts' basic monthly pay is fixed according to years of professional experience using the brackets below for guidance.

This amount will be increased by:

- 0 to 25% of a reference amount (EURO 4 492 per month) according to living conditions at the location of the mission,
- 5% of basic pay as a head-of-family allowance,
- EURO 219 per month for each dependent child up to a maximum of EURO 878 per month,
- a daily settling-in allowance fixed according to the place of work and payable for up to two months.

Social security cover (sickness, accident) and insurance policies (incapacity, death, pension equal to 13,50% of the basic salary) are fixed by the contractual provisions and the legislation applicable. The Commission has set up the same group insurance as in the JED Programme (see later). In accordance with contractual conditions, experts are entitled to annual paid leave calculated on the basis of 45 calendar days per year. Experts are paid one trip to their home country per year.

Payment is regulated according to the following categories:

- Category I: 3 to 5 years' professional experience: EURO 2 675 to 3 750 per month
- Category II: 5 to 10 years' professional experience: EURO 3 210 to 5 350 per month
- Category III: 10 to 20 years' professional experience: EURO 4 280 to 6 950 per month
- Category IV: over 20 years' professional experience: EURO 5 350 to 8 550 per month.

The main criterion for determining the basic salary will be years of professional experience although other criteria, such as the expert's level of training, quality of professional experience and the degree of difficulty or responsibility of the assignment may also be taken into account.

All together the yearly costs per expert including all administration and logistics are between 150.000 and 200.000 Euro.

### *Conclusion*

The experience of running this roster is valuable for any possible roster to be set up by ECPC. The lessons learned are relevant for any decision about the question whether the Commission should consider a central, Brussels based roster for ECPC or not. Especially the fact that the recruitment process was rather slow and not seen as very efficient by the Delegations has to be considered regarding the demands for fast deployment in crisis related missions.

It has to be questioned whether the EU regulations allow the necessary flexibility for the deployment of crisis experts under ECPC. The contractual obligations and administrative requirements under the Individual Experts Roster were not flexible enough for the field deployment. For example contracts had to be under Belgian law and had to be in one of the three official Belgian languages. The Brussels Unit has been involved in many administrative tasks and organisational issues of the individual assignments. Fore example the fact that the Head of Unit had to sign all contracts related to the deployment, such as renting of cars for the Experts, has slowed down the mission management and has lead to a heavy workload of the Unit.

Another constraint is given by the fact that contracts with Individual Experts can only end before the agreed contractual ending date for reasons that are "*faute grave*". Those need to be declared within three days of the committed misbehaviour. In the Commission it is usually not possible to take a decision with such gravity within three days. It is therefore not possible to end a contract before the end date.

## **7.4 Election Observer Roster**

### *Description of the Election Observer Roster*

Election missions are part of the mandate of the EU whose Treaty considers the protection and promotion human rights and support for democratisation as a corner stone of EU foreign policy and EU development co-operation. The EU started observing elections in 1993 in Russia and in 1994 in South Africa. Until 2000, the EU followed a case-by-case approach, through CFSP instrument and Community projects. The Commission organises about eight to ten Election Observation Missions (EOM) per year. In recent years, EU electoral missions have grown in frequency whether under the auspices of the Common Foreign and Security Policy or within the Community context, and in particular its development cooperation.

In order to streamline the selection of EU Election Observers, the European Commission has developed an online Roster, which increases the speed of the selection process and makes it more transparent. Candidates are asked to enter their CV into an electronic form provided on EuropeAid's web site<sup>19</sup>. After screening the CVs of their own nationals, Member State Governments also propose the most qualified candidates for the position of Long-Term or Short-Term Observer (LTO/STO) in individual EU Election Observation Missions. For this

---

<sup>19</sup> [http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/observer/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/observer/index_en.htm)

purpose the Commission has set up a network of national focal points. Those points are usually in the ministries of foreign affairs but in some cases also in specialised agencies<sup>20</sup>. The final selection of LTOs and STOs is made by the Commission. Core Team experts are directly recruited by the Commission.

For insurance purposes, the Commission imposes an age limit of 70 years. All EU observers are expected to adhere a Code of Conduct<sup>21</sup>. The minimum requirements for selection have been defined in the *EU Guidelines on Common Criteria for the Selection of Electoral Observers*<sup>22</sup>. All candidates are expected to fulfil among other the following minimum standards:

- Citizen of an EU Member States
- Previous experience of election monitoring and/or other relevant experience in this field.
- Interpersonal skill that allow the candidate to work under the specific conditions that occur in EOMs (working in teams, sensitive political and multi-cultural environment, etc.)
- Ability to maintain professional independence and strict impartiality
- Demonstrated commitment to democracy and human rights

Core Team Members are recruited through a specific call for applications. Core Team Members are experts with a very sound experience in EOMs. They have already participated in different EOMs as core team members or have served as Long Term Observers (LTO). Additionally they bring in a particular expertise relevant to EOMs. They can be for example legal experts, security or media experts.

LTOs are usually already experienced in EOMs and have participated in several EOMs. These could be EU or non-EU missions (OSCE, ODIHR).

### *Possible Linkages to ECPC*

Election monitoring is closely linked to the EU's work in conflict prevention and management. The instrument is part of the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). EIDHR is an essential complement to the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy objectives in the field of conflict prevention. In some regions, it provides at present the only legal base for certain activities including the promotion of political and civil rights, election observation and conflict resolution initiatives.

On a more practical level there are mainly two linkages to a possible ECPC. The roster addresses experts with a profile relevant to ECPC. The integration of this roster into a possible ECPC roster is therefore an option. At least a common standard for both rosters should be developed to facilitate the registration and management for both sides the Commission and the applicants.

Secondly there are some of the focal points for this roster who maintain rosters for fields outside elections but related to conflict. These focal points could be potential network partners for a decentralised ECPC.

### *Lessons learned from the Election Observer Roster*

---

<sup>20</sup> In Germany for example: Centre for International Peace Operations, see more details in Annex 6

<sup>21</sup> Preconditions for observation and the Code of Conduct for EU Electoral Observers have been laid down in Council Decision 9262/98.

<sup>22</sup> [http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/observer/observer\\_selection\\_criteria\\_en.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/observer/observer_selection_criteria_en.pdf)

The Election Observer Roster is a well established and effectively working mechanism to recruit experts from a very specific field. The roster is appreciated by both the Commission and the applicants.

The roster is a mix of a centralised and de-centralise management structure. It works with focal points in the Members States but does the selection of candidates and the administration of missions on a central level. This set up can serve as a model case for a possible ECPC roster.

However it has to be taken into account that the implementation of this roster faces less difficulties as a future ECPC would need to face. First of all the field of election observation is in general easier to manage than the planned activities under ECPC. Despite the fact that election observation sometimes takes place in sensitive environments, election monitoring missions are today well established and in most cases a routine for all participants. There are today many experienced election observers available so that recruiting is less difficult as for ECPC. The more sensitive positions as the Core Team Members are selected outside this instrument.

### *Conclusion*

The Election Observer Roster is a good example for a specialised recruitment instrument within the Commission. It shows how the cooperation with national focal points is possible and how to recruit specialised experts effectively. The election field is also interesting for the activities of ECPC and the instrument could be integrated into or at least linked to a new structure for ECPC.

## **7.5 Relex Contract Agents**

### *Description of Relex Contract Agents*

In 2005 the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO) has launched a Call for Expression of Interest on behalf of the Commission<sup>23</sup>. The purpose of this call is to constitute a database of candidates to be recruited as contract agents to work in Commission Delegations in 128 countries throughout the world, mainly to advise on and administer development assistance projects and programmes. The Commission is in search of so called 'Contract Agents' to fill posts that will become available in EU delegations in third countries. Contract agents will perform their duties under the supervision of officials or temporary staff of EU Delegations. Most of them are going to work in a thematic development aid section or in the contracts and finance section of the Delegation. The filling of any vacancy for a contract agent will follow the specific short-term needs of the Delegation at which a vacancy arise.

This first ever call concerning contract agents which focuses on functions to be carried out in Commission Delegations is linked to a transitory simplified recruitment. This procedure responds to the exceptional need of the External Service to ensure the continuity of operations in delegations in a period during which a considerable number of fixed-term contracts come to an end, until a database of candidates tested under a full selection procedure, including written tests, will have been established. For this reason, selected candidates following this Call will receive a contract limited to a period of a maximum of three years. A renewal of this contract will be subject, inter alia, to the incumbent having successfully completed a full EPSO selection procedure at the relevant function level.

---

<sup>23</sup> [http://europa.eu.int/epso/contract-agents/call-for-interest\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/epso/contract-agents/call-for-interest_en.htm)

The Commission is in search of candidates for eight sectors of activity:

Sector 1: Infrastructures

Sector 2: Rural development, food security and natural resources

Sector 3: Economic and trade development

Sector 4: Social and cultural issues

**Sector 5: Institution building and good governance**

Sector 6: Finance and contracts

Sector 7: Political and commercial questions

Sector 8: Security of persons and effects

For ECPC the Sector 5 is of particular interest. Sub-sectors of expertise for this sector are:

- Institution building
- Prevention of conflicts and national reconciliation
- Rule of law and Human rights
- Justice, freedom and security
- Audits

According to the Call for Expression of Interest the following fields will apply:

- institutional development: reform of the public service, financial control (ex-ante and a posteriori /audit), Court of Auditors, tax policy, processes of development of the law, decentralization; public services; management of the transition, public calls for tenders.
- rule of law and human rights: basic rights, electoral processes, access to information, etc.
- **conflict prevention and national reconciliation, crisis management, disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation,**
- justice, freedom and safety: asylum and migrations; visa policy; control of the borders; illegal immigration; trade in human beings, in assets and in drugs, etc; organized crime including money laundering; economic and financial criminality; legal system, commercial, administrative and criminal /judicial cooperation business; terrorism; basic rights and data protection; penitentiary field; fraud and corruption; police forces and organization of the police forces, etc.
- civil society, gender issues, etc.

Recruited Contract Agents will work within the implementation of projects and programmes of development aid and of financial and technical cooperation with third countries. The tasks included will be for example support for the analysis, management and supervision of projects and programs. Functions cover in particular:

- support for the preparation and the implementation of programs and projects,
- analysis and drafting of periodic reports and briefings and /or on service request,
- launching and monitoring of technical studies,
- checking of tender documents and /or analysis of the offers from the technical point of view,
- follow-up and checking of the deliveries,
- contact with the representatives of the diplomatic missions of the Member States, of the principal international donors, and /or of the international or regional organizations, with the local economic operators, the national authorities and institutions, the NGOs, the civil society and local non-official actors, etc.

The Call targets candidates of EU Member States with a university degree and with professional experience of at least one year in one of the above-mentioned eight sectors of activity. Candidates have to indicate the sub-sector to the selected main sector in which they have acquired their professional experience. Sub-sectors will be targeted during the selection

process in order to respond to a very specific knowledge need for a post or in order to reduce the number of applicants which are ultimately to be retained and best fit into the vacancy profile. Candidates must have a thorough knowledge of English or French as well as a satisfactory knowledge of a second language of the Community.

The contract agents' working relationship, which will be applied, is regulated by the Conditions of employment of other servants of the European Communities (CEOS)<sup>24</sup>.

Salaries paid to contract agents range from 1.439 Euro (basic net salary, no children, no expatriate) up to 5957 Euro.<sup>25</sup> An allowance to compensate for difficult local living conditions will be granted in applicable countries as a factor of the basic salary, ranging from 0 % to 40 % depending on the location.<sup>26</sup> An accommodation scheme is applicable allowing for housing that depends on the composition of the dependent family living with the contract agent. This latter element – and some other elements – is not applicable to contract agents that will be assigned to a place that is located within the EU.

In addition, a correction coefficient will be applied on salary parts that are being paid in local currency; this coefficient can be higher or lower than 1 according to the countries. School allowances will be granted to cover schooling fees of dependent children. An annual lump sum is paid for travel of the agent and the family to and from the country of origin. The agent will also receive an allocation for removal expenses in case he/she has to change his/her residence to take up duties. There is a complementary sickness insurance as well, allowing for reimbursement of expenses or parts of expenses which are not recoverable under the scheme applicable at Headquarters.

### *Linkages to ECPC*

The potential for linkages to ECPC are limited as here a Call for Expressions of Interest is concerned. The procedure is in a very early stage and there is and will not be a new EU service in place. However this procedure should not be ignored as there are two main linkages possible between this Call and ECPC. The first is the learning function out of this Call about applying candidates and their profile. Secondly, selected candidates could be of future interest for ECPC, during and after the completion of their assignment in one of the EU Delegations.

Areas included in Sector 5 of this Call are of relevance for ECPC. Some fields are related directly or indirectly to conflict prevention and management. In particular the following fields overlap with possible activities performed under ECPC: rule of law and human rights (basic rights, electoral processes), conflict prevention and national reconciliation, crisis management, disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation, justice, police forces. This Call therefore targets the same 'experts' as a possible ECPC.

The EU should consider a specific analysis of the applications with a closer look at their relevance for ECPC. This analysis could provide valuable information about the kind of 'expert' who is interested in this kind of assignment (background, years of experience, qualification, etc.). A survey of candidates applying for Sector 5 could provide information about where candidates learned about the this Call, why they apply, what they expect, what their main interest in working with the EU is, etc. All these information is important for a possible later recruitment or call for ECPC.

A second possible linkage can be seen in a mid-term perspective. Recruited candidates could remain in network –maintained by the EU or by decentralised network partners- that is used for ECPC. Candidates who have served in a Delegation in a country with a conflict

---

<sup>24</sup> [http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/personnel\\_administration/statut/tocen100.pdf#page=128](http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/personnel_administration/statut/tocen100.pdf#page=128)

<sup>25</sup> <http://europa.eu.int/epso/contract-agents/salaires-ca-2005.pdf>

<sup>26</sup> [http://europa.eu.int/epso/contract-agents/living%20allowances\\_en.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/epso/contract-agents/living%20allowances_en.pdf)



environment will be of high interest for future deployments within the framework of ECPC. Candidates will have acquired valuable insight knowledge of the EU and its engagement in third countries.

### *Conclusion*

The present Call for Expressions of Interests concerns areas with high relevance for ECPC. The experience of this Call and the contact to candidates selected for assignments should be taken into account when setting up ECPC.

## **7.6 Junior Experts in Delegation Programme-JED Programme**

### *Description of the JED Programme*

The Junior Experts in Delegation Programme is also known as the JED Programme. The programme originates from a 1984 initiative of Commissioner L. Natale. The programme is aimed at providing qualified university graduates from EU Member States with experience in the European Commission's External Service Delegations situated in developing countries.

The idea of this programme is to enable Junior Experts to spend some time in the Commission's External Service Delegations, involving them in some of the Delegations' work, for the purpose of training. The initiative is sponsored by the European Commission and the Member States of the EU. It enables successful candidates to be employed as a full member of the administrative and technical staff of a Delegation for a period of two years.

The programme provides young professionals with experience and comprehension of EU procedures and institutions and also provides Delegations with important development and cooperation expertise. The programme has seen 559 recruits in Delegations throughout the World. It has proven to be a highly attractive programme with many Junior Experts continuing their career within the Commission.

The JED Programme is composed of two different folders which run simultaneously, the 'Community' and 'Bilateral' components:

Under the Community folder the Junior Expert is financed entirely by the Commission allowing the recruitment, every two years, of 15 Junior Experts (1 candidate for each of the 15 Member States until May this year). Where the budget allows some supplementary posts are eventually given to the most competent candidates independent of their nationality.

The Bilateral procedure concerns those Member States who have concluded bilateral agreements with the Commission. The characteristics are exactly the same as the Community procedure however Junior Experts recruited through this process are wholly financed by their Member State (with the exception of Spanish and French VIA (*Volontaires Internationaux Administratifs*) candidates who are under a joint funding agreement).

To be eligible candidates must have a minimum of one and maximum four years professional experience:

- have citizenship of an EU Member State
- be not more than 30 years of age on 1 January of the year in which they are selected by the Commission.
- have a University degree or equivalent qualification, preferably in economics, engineering or agriculture, or other fields relevant to the Commission's work in non-member countries.

- have a perfect command of English and/or French and minimum knowledge of the other, plus, where appropriate, another language much used in the region concerned.
- if selected be declared by the Commission's Medical Service, fit to serve in a third country.

### *Linkages to ECPC*

The JED Programme is addressing young and rather inexperienced professionals. The qualification in a crisis related field is not a condition for recruitment. This means that there is no linkage to ECPC, which depends on highly qualified crisis management or crisis prevention experts. Even if JED participants work in countries with pre- or post conflict situations the two programmes should be separated entirely.

### *Lessons learned from the JED Programme*

Some aspects of the JED Programme are of relevance for a possible ECPC. The fact that 'Experts' are recruited for a limited time period and work within the EU structure is a valuable experience, which shows practices for a possible ECPC. Most relevant here are the organisation and resources necessary for the management of the programme. Further relevant are contractual arrangement for the external experts.

The JED programme is managed by a small and efficient structure in Brussels. This is only possible for two main reasons: First the recruitment is done through the EU Member States and only the final selection is done on central level. Second the JED programme participants work within the structure of the Commission.

That means that the Commission has to make resources available on the Delegation level to integrate them into the daily work. In carrying out their duties, JED Experts work under the supervisory authority of the relevant Commission departments and the Head of the Commission Delegation in the country in which they are posted. They comply with the rules of conduct in force in the Delegation, notably as regards performance standards and working hours. Similar arrangement will need to apply for every other external 'Expert', for example under ECPC.

Each Junior Expert is recruited on a training contract limited to two years (one year renewable by mutual consent for a second year at the end of the first). Contracts can not be extended beyond two years, save in exceptional cases of *force majeure*, at the discretion of the Commission.

The appointment of Junior Experts are governed by the Belgian legislation on employment contracts applicable to contracts concluded by the Commission on the basis of the general conditions applicable to fixed-term contracts for Junior Experts in Delegation and including the special conditions governing their appointment.<sup>27</sup> The appointment of Junior Experts does not confer on them the status of official or "Other Servant" of the Commission, the conditions for appointment to the European public service are strictly defined by the Staff Regulations and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the Commission. Finally, the Commission has no obligation to recruit the Junior Expert as technical assistant at the end of his/her training contract.

---

<sup>27</sup> Training Programme for Young Experts Assigned to a Delegation, General Terms and Conditions governing fixed-term Contracts, VM 041/98 (2)

The Commission organises a three-week induction course in Brussels prior to the Experts' departure for their countries of employment. The Experts must attend this course or forfeit the offer of training.

## 8. Profile of volunteers and the nature and duration of assignments

The ideal profile of an ECPC-volunteer is considered to be a person with relevant **field experience** from the area of focus, speaking the relevant **language** and having knowledge about culture, religion and ethnicity. There is a great need for skills in communication and cooperation. Qualifications and experience with inter-cultural cooperation is essential. And cooperation should not just be with local stakeholders but also with other international observers and missions. In pre- and post conflict situations in Africa it will be important for ECPC-volunteers to work in integrated missions with peaceworkers from both Europe and African countries. It was noted by some of the interviewed that there is no reason why ECPC should not include volunteers from non-EU countries; the coordination of mechanisms such as RRM with ECPC could help build multi-regional bodies of volunteers where relevant.

These overall qualifications come both above and beyond possible specific qualifications, such as expertise in:

- Governance
- Human Rights Monitoring
- Minority Rights
- Human Security
- Training and Education
- Peace Education
- Rule of Law
- Democratisation and democratic institutions
- Conflict Management
- mediation and conflict resolution
- Media and media development
- Elections
- Civil administration
- Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
- Civil society development
- Mission management
- Mission administration and support.

In any case the need for qualified staff in very specific fields is an argument to **drop the term 'volunteer'** when discussing ECPC. A whole discussion could be opened about it and the value of volunteers for the society. In the case of ECPC it is rather misleading as there is a need for qualified experts for a very specific field who will work under difficult conditions in sensitive environments.

While the specific qualifications have to be determined on an activity-by-activity base it is considered important with a clear **distinction to traditional long term development activities** and to emergency related humanitarian activities. It is fully recognized that it is often difficult or impossible to split long term activities into phases from pre conflict to conflict, humanitarian assistance, post conflict, rehabilitation and long term development assistance. But exactly because such distinction and differentiation may be impossible it is important that ECPC tasks are defined in relation to the thematic issues which are in need for ECPC-assistance. This will also make it possible for ECPC-assistance to function in parallel and cooperation with other types of activities and interventions.

This agreement in principle on the overall profile, and on recruitment and activity demands however is being differentiated by at least two concerns, which may lead to some compromises:

- The fact that the **new member countries** for historical reasons yet have only a very limited number of professionals with international field experience can make it necessary to think in a kind of quota system to secure participation from these countries. One way of doing it may be to compose teams or missions with a small number of less experienced team members in a group.

- **Young** singles are more readily available for rapid deployment than older and more experienced people who are also more likely to have families and other obligations, which make them less likely to leave with short notice. It is a contradiction that the more experienced professionals are those mostly requested but at the same time the least available.

Candidates are likely to be found from within NGO's, at universities and research institutions, and within the wider civil society. Some of the most obvious candidates from the civil society could be former junior professional officers and volunteers in the UN-system, and former national volunteers and development workers from national NGOs and government agencies. The fact that a number of European NGOs in EPLO (European Peace-building Liaison Office), ENCPS (European Network for Civil Peace Services) and PBI (Peace Brigades International) have started building up national and local capacity and experience with peace services is also gradually leading to a bigger base of professionals with experience from different regions and nations.

The sketchy outline of the role of ECPC makes it only possible to conclude preliminary on the question of the normal **duration** of ECPC-assignments. There will be a need for rapid and short term as well as long term deployment.

The deployment of peaceworkers e. g. in the German government-funded ZFD-service is based on assignments with at least 2 years duration and the possibility of extension and the nature of a number of conflicts (including pre and post conflict periods) indicate that when ECPC is involved in assistance there may be a need for long term involvement.

The reality is that it may be difficult or impossible to recruit sufficient number of professionals with seniority and field experience for long term missions, but the ECPC-system needs to take the need for continuity and long term involvement into account.

One way of making it possible to use the benefit of short term professionals and still respect the need for long term involvement can be to combine long and shorter term volunteers in integrated ECPC-missions.

## 9. Potential recruitment models for ECPC

As documented in the description of the very different national recruitment structures, recruitment for ECPC has to be based on the fact that there is no common European uniform model for national registration and/or recruitment of volunteers and professionals for international short and long term missions. It is however, in spite of national variations, possible to identify a number of typical structures which can be used if it is decided to base recruitment for ECPC on a decentralised system with national focal points.

The following is a description of different potential recruitment models and structures:

### 9.1 Expanded government recruitment systems

All EU-member countries and associated countries have existing systems for providing short term professionals for OSCE, UN, EU and other international organisations. The systems or centres, normally based within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are very different. In some countries – primarily some of the new member countries – recruitment primarily takes place from within the narrow government structure, while the system in other countries has been expanded to include recruitment from a variety of sources including universities and the civil society.

Among the more developed expanded systems is the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (**NORDEM**) with two rosters: a) a stand-by-force for rapid deployment and b) a resource base covering a broad range of thematic areas.

The German Centre for International Peace Operations (**ZIF**) is having exchange with the German Civil Peace Service (**ZFD**) which includes NGO's as well as the government Development Service (DED). ZIF is also an example of a more developed national recruitment system. ZIF has a roster with profiles among others in core areas such as good governance, human rights, civil affairs and the legal sector. ZIF is organising training for civilians e. g. in security and in intercultural communication.

It is not be possible without adjustments and in some cases considerable changes or expansions to use all government recruitment systems for ECPC-recruitment, but the national systems have a long tradition not least for providing experts and other professionals for OSCE and the UN, and they form a structure which can be build upon also in relation to the civil society.

### 9.2 Specialised Civil Society systems for recruitment of peace workers

NGO's with peace building, peace education and conflict management as their main focus have seen growing activity over the last years in some EU-countries. In Germany the peace service (**ZFD**) is based on government funding. The different European peace related NGO's have a variety of systems for recruitment of volunteers and professionals and for their deployment as peace workers.

The most comprehensive roster for peace workers are in 2005 under development in **Peaceworkers Register** UK. The register is expected to be on line operative for recruitment before the end of 2005. It is designed so that partner NGO's in other countries, like (NEAG) in the Netherlands and Forum ZFD in Germany can also use it. The system will be based on

quality-control including assessment of the individual candidates before they are forwarded to potential employers. The idea is to develop the register further and to reach a size between 1.000 and 2.000 candidates, which is seen as the optimum, possibly with the lower level as the more realistic. According to the description Peaceworkers Register will be a database, which at present comes close to the ideal needs for a recruitment system for ECPC.

Most NGO's deploying peaceworkers and having conflict management and peace education, monitoring and mediation as their focal area, do not maintain own rosters, but do – as Forum ZFD in Germany – look for individual candidates for each position. Many are however interested in developing better registers or rosters. Some can with the necessary support be developed to national focal points. The European Peace Building Liaison Office (EPLO) may play a role in the development of national focal points.

### ***9.3 Common Volunteer sending organisations (VSO's)***

There is no shared European understanding of the term volunteering, European organisations which deploy development workers or volunteers are doing so in different ways, based on different principles and with different remuneration systems. Some do only deploy national volunteers, others like the British VSO, deploys volunteers from different countries in North and South. More and more European NGO's do also employ local volunteers or development workers and programme officers in countries in the South.

Many VSO's have experienced that new demands have lead to a change in the profile of volunteers or development workers. Volunteers have gradually become older and more experienced and professionals. Some organisations have reinvented their programmes (like the Norwegian peace corps 'Fredskorpset') to make it possible still to be a programme with a focus on very young professionals.

The variety makes it necessary to **asses the VSO- and NGO-situation country by country** to identify the possibilities for utilising national VSO's, or other NGO's for potential ECPC-recruitment.

While this is a complicating challenge, experienced former volunteers and/or development workers will often have the professional experience and field-experience needed for ECPC-assignments. Some of the organisations maintain rosters of former development workers which can be used.

A number of national volunteer organisations do also have experience from being the national "recruitment agencies" for the UN (for example for United Nations Volunteers; national refugee councils and associations are recruiting for UNHCR).

### ***9.4 Potential recruitment models in new Member States***

There is a need for special treatment of a number of new EU Member States. Eastern European countries have less experience with development cooperation through governments as well as through NGO's. Ministries of Foreign Affairs do often also recruit professionals for OSCE from a very narrow internal ministry base. As a result of the limited institutional experience there is only a limited numbers of professional individuals with field experience from outside Europe.

National branches of the George Soros-Foundation have been instrumental for the development of the civil society in many Eastern European countries, and they may be able

to play a similar role in relation to ECPC. The Batory Foundation in Poland has over a period been responsible for recruitment of professionals for OSCE as a result of outsourcing from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

It may be necessary to set different standards for recruitment from new EU member countries and to accept young and/or less experienced professionals than in the old member countries. This can possibly be done as part of a system where less experienced ECPC-members can work together with more experienced professionals in integrated small teams suited for such a differentiation.

### **9.5 Recruitment on commercial terms**

There is a number of big European consultancy companies with considerable experience in technical assistance and development cooperation including with advisory roles in relation to conflict management. They have professional rosters of experienced individuals, many with relevant background for ECPC.

The study has not focused upon this sector, and most of the professionals which can be made available through these companies may be more expensive experts for short term tasks. There is however no doubt that the bigger companies are able to expand and adjust their existing systems to provide for ECPC-candidates. Possible models could be a larger service contract or a framework contract with different consortia from all EU Member States.

However this set up could no longer be called a 'volunteer corps' but could be an efficient instrument to outsource the recruitment of qualified experts.

### **9.6 A combination of different models**

It is one of the conclusions of this study (see above) that recruitment for ECPC should be based on a decentralised system respecting the different conditions in different countries and having insight in local and national circumstances.

A central register at EU level may imply problems with data protection as different countries have different standards and it will be very difficult to reflect national differences in a centralised system. A decentralised system will also make it easier to support extra efforts to mobilise resources in some countries.

A number of other factors indicate that roster and pre-selection of candidates should be based on national systems

- the wish to involve the civil society in the recruitment and in mobilisation of additional human resources make it necessary to base recruitment on a good knowledge about the national civil society in each country including the NGO's and existing recruitment systems within the civil society.
- national pre-selection will be in line with the systems used for intergovernmental organisations like OSCE. UNV-recruitment and pre-selection of junior professional officers (JPO's) for UNDP and other UN-organisations are also based on national recruitment.
- different national systems make a thorough knowledge about the national labour market and educational systems important.

The variety of systems for recruitment is a challenge in this respect and national systems will have to be different in different Member States. It will be possible to select **national focal points** on the basis of an assessment of existing capacity and experiences, sometimes such



national focal points will be based on close cooperation between the public and civil sectors such as e. g. in the case of Germany, while it in other cases is possible to support or strengthen already existing database-systems in the NGO-sector, such as e. g. the Peaceworkers Register in the UK.

The previous sections are dealing with remuneration principles, nature and duration of the volunteers' assignment, profile of volunteers and necessary training of the volunteers. While they may be a further illustration of differences they do not change the overall picture of available models for recruitment. A decentralised system will not solve problems arising from the fact that candidates from different countries are covered by different legal systems including different principles for taxation, which will have influence on remuneration principles. Other international systems live with such differences as it will be more complicated to try to solve such problems through a centralised system.

## 10. To set up the management of ECPC

There is a close link between the choice of supply models (decentralised or central) and the management structure for ECPC. But the management structure does also have its own choices and demands. In this chapter the following issues will be discussed:

- Centralized or decentralized structure
- Central management unit
- Management functions
- Costs

### 10.1 Decentralized Structure

The decision whether to have a centralized or decentralized structure needs to be taken on two levels:

- Recruitment level and management of a roster
- Deployment and management of operation

It is one of the conclusions of this study that ECPC after a pilot phase should be based on a **decentralised recruitment structure** with identification and pre selection of qualified candidates at national level, and with the possibility of establishing framework agreements with either European NGOs or national agencies. A possible model for such a framework agreement could be the DG ECHO Framework Partnership Agreement (FPA). Within this or a comparable structure the EU would still have enough influence on standards and principles but would at the same time profit from the potential that lies in a decentralized recruitment. The EU could fund training initiatives to achieve higher qualification and standards in civilian crisis management.

A full fledged central unit is the alternative but would involve more resources and time for preparation. The added value of another central recruitment agency in Europe compared to the potential of a decentralized structure that involves national agencies and civil society is not evident. The unit would be in competition with the existing agencies and would need to recruit from the same limited pool of qualified experts.

Differences in national recruitment structures are to a large degree a reflection of different national traditions, different labour laws, different remuneration principles and different levels of international cooperation. It will be very difficult to reflect such differences in a centralised recruitment system, and most stakeholders agree that it is important to know the national systems, including training systems, to be able to make the best recruitment.

A central register at EU level may imply problems with data protection as different countries have different standards. In an initial phase of the development of ECPC the costs of developing and maintaining a central register may be disproportionate in relation to the number of deployed candidates.

A number of other factors indicate that rosters and pre-selection of candidates should preferably be based on national systems:

- the wish to involve the civil society in recruitment makes it necessary to base pre-selection on a good knowledge about the national civil society in each country, including the NGO's and existing recruitment systems within the civil society.

- National pre-selection is in line with the systems used for intergovernmental organisations like OSCE. UNV-recruitment and pre-selection of junior professional officers (JPO's) for UNDP and other UN-organisations are also based on national agencies.
- Different capacity levels and levels of experience make it necessary to make special national efforts to find candidates e. g. in some of the new Member States.
- Different national systems make thorough knowledge about the national labour market and educational system important.

The question about a decentralized set up on the **deployment side** depends on the decision whether ECPC would include the implementation of EU programmes or would send experts to programmes of other organisations (UN, OSCE, NGOs). The latter would be per se a decentralized approach. The first option highly depends on the role of the Delegations in supporting missions and requesting experts, an aspect which could not be dealt with in more detail in this study.

In any case, as stated above, the crucial importance of mission support and the need to involve local partners speak for a decentralized approach.

## **10.2 Central management unit**

A decentralised structure will however still be in need for a small efficient **central management unit** within the Commission to make ECPC function as an EU instrument. A lesson learned from OSCE/ODIHR is that it is very important to have substance people (and not only administrative people) at the headquarter level. There is a need to have people who can leave HQ's immediately, to "kick off" and to establish structures for coming missions etc.

This is also the experience from OSCE election observer missions. The need here is for a central structure, a core group of very experienced professionals to create the framework for new missions on the spot, and in parallel with that process the recruitment and selection of the bigger group of observers.

While an ECPC-model with European NGO's having the responsibility for implementation in accordance with a framework agreement will be different, it will still be important to have a small but strong EU-unit not just for budget control, consideration of applications and monitoring of databases but also with substance people making certain that ECPC-activities are EU-activities in line with other activities and taking part in identification and assessment missions.

This is also in line with the proposal as formulated by the European Parliament. It speaks about ECPC as consisting of two parts: A core of full-time employed professionals to fulfil management tasks and ensure continuity, and a pool of mission-specific professionals to be called on for specific missions.

## **10.3 Management functions**

The following management functions seem to be required from any structure that would supervise the ECPC:

1. Development and maintenance of a roster of volunteers
2. Development and supervision of training
3. Liaison with Commission and other organisations carrying out activities
4. Final selection of projects to be carried out by ECPC.

5. Final allocation of volunteers to projects and at least the monitoring of management in the field

There can be a range of modalities for each of these functions:

1. Development and maintenance of a roster of volunteers. This function could be carried out by:

- Developing a new database.
- Setting up a liaison mechanism and establishing national focal points amongst existing national organisations.

The information given above about the situation in various Member States shows that a liaison mechanism might be difficult to implement. The first solution would possibly lead to a more effective structure, but alone it would be limited in access to qualified experts. The compromise could be a liaison mechanism with some of the Member States and not all of them so that administrative constraints are reduced to a minimum. A model could be the present roster for election observers (see above).

2. Development and supervision of training. This could be done by:

- Commissioning an institution to carry out a training course
- Setting up requirements and standards for training courses
- Ensuring a validation process for a qualification

By definition, the body of ECPC volunteers would be scattered around the EU (and beyond its borders). This suggests that a unique training course would not be appropriate. The alternative seems to be for the ECPC management structure to develop criteria for such a training (areas to be covered, etc) as well as quality benchmarks, against which both training institutions and trainees themselves could be tested.

It seems quite clear that the training should be based upon a combination between national and European courses. Most existing systems, such as ZIF, NORDEM and IHB are based on compulsory national courses with duration from a few days to two weeks. It would be natural to make basic training the basis for the acceptance into a national roster, and to complement the national training with training at the European EU-level to make certain that ECPC-volunteers all have a similar understanding of their roles and responsibilities. The experiences in the EU Pilot project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management should be taken into account. I would say even more: The pilot should not only be taken into account, but should be developed further so that it can fulfil exactly the function that is needed for ECPC. It would need more attention by the EU (and maybe more funding) so that it is a bit more centralized and tailor made for EU purposes.

3. Liaison with other EU services and external organisations. Assuming the ECPC is not itself an agency of the Commission (see below), the liaison function could, for example, be implemented through a form of framework contract between the Commission and bigger NGO's.

4. Selection of projects: This function could depend on the status of the ECPC: if it is merely a provider of professionals to operations of other organisations (UN, OSCE, NGOs), the ECPC management structure does not necessarily need to have a selection function. If it is involved in managing projects, it would need to be involved in their design at some stage. In Annex 5 ECPC relation to presently existing EU instruments in Crisis Management is presented and possible linkages are highlighted.

5. Allocation of volunteers/professionals to projects and their management in the field. As above, this function will be minimal if the structure merely provides people to other agencies. However, direct negotiations with candidates and implementing agencies may make this a

complex function. Again the set up of using a structure similar to the DG ECHO FPA can serve to fulfill the necessary requirements for a decentralized but guided management approach. The FPA is a specialised tool, developed over time and specifically for quick action in emergency situations. It is an exemption from other EU regulations and provides a high degree of flexibility and responsiveness.

## **10.4 Costs to be considered**

This section deals with cost elements which need to be considered for ECPC. It is divided into first a part about costs to set up a recruitment system and second a part for the costs for the deployment of experts. The statements are based on the above elaborated models and examples.

### *Costs to set up a recruitment system*

The budget necessary to set up a recruitment system depends on the different models that are possible:

- Selection of a network of organisations as focal points and a central roster.
- To set up a new central roster.
- Recruit directly through existing agencies.

A costly alternative is to **select new organisations as national focal points**, and to have them build up new systems. It is therefore recommended to set up a system that would integrate already existing rosters into a Europe wide network with common standards. As shown above these organisations are available (but not in all Member States). The resources necessary for this process could be limited to a staff of three (full time), as is shown by examples inside and outside the EU (see examples above).

The resources to set up a **full fledged system** will be at least comparable to the costs for the now closing Roster for Individual Experts. A structure of minimum 8 full time staff will be necessary to set up and manage the system. This does not include staff for programming or mission support on the ground.

NGOs calculate with the rough estimate of 50.000 Euros for the first year and 40.000 Euros for the following for the possible costs involved in relation to the **establishment of a new roster/data base** and the provision of the necessary information gathering and publicity to make the roster known.

To make **use of already existing rosters** that are open for external users two ways to indicate costs are possible:

Peaceworkers register UK for example is using the following principles: A 'client' who wants to include candidates from the register in the clients own roster pays a fee of 500 British Pounds pr. Client and another 500 Pounds when the candidate is deployed. When the register supplies candidates for a co-operating NGO the normal recruitment fee is 20 – 25 % of the first annual fee. It is possible for partners working continuously with the Peaceworkers register to agree on a flat annual rate. Nonviolent Peaceforce for example pays 20.000 dollars a year to be able to use the register. Selection of candidates can then be based on a fee, possibly 500-1.000 Euro per candidate.

The simplest way is to **finance already existing national recruitment**. Costs can be calculated in the that an administrative overhead is added to the overall costs of a national candidate. Danish Refugee Council (DRC) calculates a 10% overhead on all costs, including salary, travel costs and per diem for administration e. g. when DRC recruits candidates for

the UN. The amount covers the full cost also of administering the candidate-database. Such an overhead system can in principle be used by all national systems already existing.

### *Costs for the deployment of experts*

The costs for the deployment of volunteers and professionals for short- and long-term posting varies both between different countries and because of different principles and types of posting. For short-term professionals, e. g. provided for OSCE, it is quite common to base remuneration on compensation of the candidates' normal salary plus the coverage of extra costs. It is different from country to country and from organisation to organisation which costs are covered and which are not. NGOs like pay less to their professionals so that it can be said that the NGO-remuneration scale is lower than the government scale.

The costs also depend from the decision whether to recruit through national systems or not. These systems are in some cases based on contrary principles. For example the remuneration in Norway, Denmark and The Netherlands are typically based on the principle of **normal salaries**, and compensation for the "loss" seconded personnel have when they are posted abroad.

On the other hand there are also volunteer postings based on **non-salary principles**. The German Peace service (ZFD), financed by the German government, is such a service. The peace workers are formally not paid salaries, but compensated for their services. The standard is in accordance with principles for German volunteers, and the monthly payment between 900 and 1200 Euro according to cost levels in project countries. Some extras are added, such as 50 % of the basic allowance for partners and 25 % for each child, plus housing, social insurance and reintegration allowances. In total a couple with two children receives app. 3000 Euro a month. ZFD peace workers are posted for a minimum of 24 months.

VSO in the UK does not apply a single remuneration policy: volunteers are paid and supported according to the policies of the organisation using them, although minimum standards are set which have to be respected by the host organisations.

There is no specific legislation in the UK on volunteering, and volunteers are subjected to normal British labour laws and other applicable legislation. Volunteers working within the UK cannot be paid at all (except a small transport and meal allowance, currently not exceeding £9.50/day), while those working abroad are not considered volunteers for the purpose of their contract, they are subject to legislation concerning ordinary employment contracts.

A rough European estimate is that the **gross costs** for volunteers are somewhere between 4.000 Euros and 13.000 Euros a month per professional depending on the national remuneration system and principles, the salary-level in the supply-countries, the places of posting, the duration of posting and the type of overhead costs.

If it is decided that ECPC will primarily be based on experienced professionals it seems realistic to assess that the costs will be in the upper end of the scale. A decision has to be taken on whether remuneration should be the same for all ECPC-volunteers with no regard to the salary level in their home country, or whether remuneration costs should reflect costs and salary levels in the home country (as it is the case today e. g. for Europeans on OSCE-missions).

In EU countries with high costs of living and high salary levels it is probably most realistic to expect gross costs per months for experienced volunteers on short-term missions to be app. 10,000 Euros per month. For longer-term missions and for volunteers from countries with a lower salary level the monthly gross cost figure can be lower.

For comparison costs of three very different types of programmes are summarized in the following:

- German Peace Service (ZFD): Annual gross costs for 50 volunteers with long term contracts (600 man months) = 1,5 million Euro
- MS, Danish Association for International Cooperation): Annual gross costs for 50 Development workers with long term contracts (600 man months) = 4,2 million.
- Nordem, Norway: Annual gross costs for 600 expert man months (based on short term contracts). (10.000 Euro per months are used as standard) = 6 million Euro.

**Income tax rules** are different from country to country, but in many countries there is a possibility for income tax exemption if the duration of a mission is longer than a certain period, e. g. 3 months. This can influence the salary and cost level. To facilitate the recruitment of volunteers from all economic backgrounds, tax provisions should ideally exempt volunteers from paying taxes on the amount they may receive as reimbursement of expenses.<sup>28</sup>

In addition to the salary as a cost factor the issues insurance, pension schemes and assistance after the mission will be discussed in the final report.

It will be costly and complicated to establish a system with the same remuneration principles and principles for covering costs for candidates from different countries with different salary levels, tax-systems and costs levels. It is recommended that recruitment of ECPC-candidates are based on uniform principles for insurance-coverage, allowances and housing, but with direct remuneration based on different national levels but same principles, being salary compensation.

Here the FPA concept could provide a solution again. DG ECHO has established flat rates including social security, benefits and allowances for professionals to be deployed.

## **10.5 Conclusion**

To carry out these functions a unit of the Commission could be set up within DG External Relations. One could also imagine that the process could be tendered out to a service provider or a consortium under a tender contract to the extent this is possible under the new financial regulation.

The recommendation is that the ECPC-system should be based on the establishment of a small efficient unit within the Commission, but with the management of the programme based on a framework partnership with relevant European NGOs or state agencies selected on the basis of their qualifications and capacity as well for identification and selection of projects as for managing ECPC-programmes.

ECPC should develop gradually over time. With the first years level is annual deployment of app 75 ECPC-volunteers in an average of 5 months, the annual total comes to 375 man months, and the annual costs to an estimated 5 million Euro.

Over time it seems realistic to let the programme grow to app 100 man years (1200 man months) a year depending on the international situation and on experiences from the first missions. Annual recurrent costs (2004 prices) for such a programme would be app 14 million Euro.

---

<sup>28</sup> Volunteerism and Legislation, IFRC/UNV 2004

This set up would also be the most cost-effective solution compared to a full-fledged service. Regarding remuneration ECPC posting can not be based on the same principles as ZFD. The most realistic is a type of salary compensation more or less similar to the principles used by NORDEM. The Scandinavian salary level however is at the upper end in the EU, but NORDEM salaries are considered modest compared to Norwegian standard. It may be realistic to calculate average gross costs per month of ECPC-deployment at 10.000 Euro plus 20% for administration and programme support and plus the costs of a small ECPC-unit within the Commission.

## 11. Requests for ECPC - The identification of needs

It is not possible to describe the demand and request structure in full details as long as it is not decided how programming will be done and to which degree European delegations will be actively involved in ECPC-activities. In this regard this study is limited in its scope.

### Different types of deployment

It is envisaged that the ECPC could be deployed at relatively short notice. This underlines the need to have a structure rapid deployment of identification missions. International NGO's with sufficient capacity could contribute and possibly in some cases be responsible for such advance missions, but the EU core unit or the Delegations will be overall responsible.

Advance missions will be instrumental in defining the nature of the potential ECPC-involvement: Rapid deployment or longer term planning, and short term as well as long term missions. "**Rapid deployment**" missions of relatively short duration could include, for example:

- Human rights monitoring: volunteers would be able to be spread in an the crisis area concerned, with a mandate to monitor and report human rights violations. This would typically need coordination with UN agencies.
- Election-related training: volunteers could be sent to crisis areas to train election workers, monitors and local NGO representatives prior to elections – this would be independent of, but in coordination with election observation as currently carried out by the EU, OSCE, etc.
- More controversially, the ECPC could be used on civilian-related tasks in crisis situations where the EU is involved in armed peace-keeping interventions. Tasks could range from mediation at community level to support for government administration, media support, legislative and judicial support, etc. short term first missions may in such cases be replaced with more long term missions The relationship between the ECPC and a military intervention need to be assessed carefully, because military presence may make it more difficult for the ECPC to be seen as neutral. Depending on the processes for managing ECPC, some NGOs may object to volunteers being involved in such activities.

**Longer-term** deployments can also be envisioned, such as assisting in bringing a conflict transformation dimension to development and possibly humanitarian activities. Tasks in this field may be very varied and according to the specific situation bring in ECPC-professionals in conflict transformation, human security, human rights, media development, civil society development and elections.

### Potential demand and requests for ECPC



ECPC should according to the original proposal function only under a mandate backed by the UN or its regional organisations. It is therefore essential to base the potential work of ECPC on close cooperation and coordination with other international and regional bodies.

Meetings with OSCE, the OSCE office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the African Union (AU) have illustrated that while there is a general interest for ECPC and also a feeling that all organisations can benefit from better European mechanisms to mobilise civilian professionals, it is also a strong feeling that there is a need to look at the duplication of efforts and also that too many different actors in some conflict situation make things even more complicated.

The need to respect the lines between the different existing organisations was stressed repeatedly. If the different mandated roles are not respected there is a risk of developing conflicts between organisations in local areas. ECPC should normally not work in areas and with themes where for example OSCE/ODIHR has the mandate and for purposes OSCE/ODIHR is already set up to work with.

OSCE is created as the European security organisation with a clear mandate within its geographical area. OSCE has established REACT (Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams) after the Kosovo-conflicts to make it possible to deploy experts with short notice. The REACT programme includes three components 1) pre-selection/pre-deployment training to ensure those selected for REACT are prepared to immediately begin work when they reach the field operation, 2) sets of standards based on defined qualifications, and 3) an online recruitment website. (See also section 4).

At meetings with the African Union-representatives the need to base interventions and activities on African ownership was stressed, and there was a general overall wish to see that all types of international cooperation in relation to conflict and crisis management contribute to the strengthening of Africa's own capacity (local, national, regional and continental) to deal with crisis management and conflict resolution.

## **12. Training**

This section flags issues regarding additional qualification of ECPC experts. It refers to training needs and existing training offered in Europe. A separate section is presented for the crucial need to link training to recruitment.

### ***12.1 Training needs for civil crisis management***

As in other areas, traditions for and experiences with training are different between different organisations. There is however general agreement that recruitment for ECPC need to be based on the selection of people with substantial general qualifications and experience.

All candidates should participate in national training courses to qualify for posting, and that more specific European ECPC- training should complement the national courses. In a decentralised system the general professional background need to be boosted through brief national training courses, and all ECPC-candidates need to take part in at least one European training course, developed specifically for ECPC. Short pre-mission induction courses need to be considered necessary for specific EU missions to fully brief the selected mission members on the mandate of the mission and the country or region of deployment prior to departure.

Important groundwork has already been laid with the implementation of the Commission Training on civilian aspects of crisis management, the establishment of REACT by OSCE, significant experiences at national level (particularly in Germany and the UK) and some pilot training initiatives developed by a wide range of non-state actors, including with ad hoc funding from the EU.

The German ZIF, in this respect, is very effective, an indication that there is possibly more coordination and interaction between Government, institutions and civil society in Germany than in other countries, Italy for instance. Similarly, the Ministry of Interior in Hungary is running excellent courses for civilians which are not used by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

As mentioned, mechanisms should be put in place to ensure that training in civilian crisis management and longer-term peace building should be open and accessible to both state and non-state experts.

### ***12.2 Existing EU training in civil crisis management***

#### *Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management*

With the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a new European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the EU is seeking to improve the effectiveness of its assistance to third countries in times of crisis and to consequently expand its capacity for crisis management tasks. In this context, a clear priority is to make more civilian experts available for EU-operations, as well as for field missions of other organisations, such as the UN and OSCE.

Following the European Council meetings at Feira in June 2000 and Göteborg in June 2001 the EU undertook to develop additional capacities through the creation of concrete personnel targets in four areas of civilian crisis management. The European Commission launched a Pilot Project in October 2001 on "Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management" for the two priority areas of rule of law and civilian administration. EU training on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management has received EIDHR funding since the beginning

2002, however DG Relex has pointed out that so far the training programme does not have an appropriate legal base and financial appropriation.

The project was divided into three phases:

Phase I included the establishment of an informal EU Group on Training - a network of EU-wide training bodies involved in training civilian personnel for crisis management activities. The EU Group on Training presented its proposals to EU Member States at a conference hosted by the Spanish Presidency in, where they found large support.

During Phase II of the project, five Pilot Core (with a total of 129 participants) and ten Pilot Specialisation Courses (with a total of 163 participants) were implemented in nine EU Member States between January 2003 and February 2004. Proposals were developed with regard to future training co-operation within the EU and with other international organisations such as the UN.

In order to foster closer training co-operation and to enlarge the pool of well trained civilian experts available at short notice, around 370 participants were trained in Phase III in addition to the 292 participants trained in the second phase. All in all 15 courses (4 Core courses, 11 Specialization courses) were implemented between January and February 2005.

Specific functional areas and fields for each of the two priority areas of rule of law and civilian administration were identified and currently training covers wide and complex range of issues and topics (core courses, rule of law, human rights, democratisation and good governance, organising civilian administration, organisational development and management skills, conflict transformation, press and public information including media development, mission administration and support).

Regrettably there is no database or centralized record (within the Commission or at a designated focal point in the EU Group on Training) of all participants trained at the various courses during these years. Furthermore, no specific mechanisms were devised and put in place by the different training institutions to evaluate individual performance of trainees, or by the EU to determine their actual willingness to participate in EU operations in the field, or to facilitate coordination with other initiatives and training opportunities, also for the purpose of supporting trainees in obtaining concrete opportunities for building up the level of field experience which is absolutely required to complement the newly acquired skills.

#### *OSCE training*

OSCE has developed rather comprehensive training standards for preparation of OSCE Mission Staff (the complete guidelines – some 80 pages are available in electronic format) which focuses, in addition to internal organizational aspects on a wide range of specific topics: rehabilitation of post-conflict societies (including introduction to human rights, democratization processes and gender issues in crisis situations), cross-cultural communication, safety and security issues, stress management and first aid and fieldwork techniques which include monitoring techniques, communicating via interpreters, conflict management techniques, information flow and co-ordination and report-writing techniques.

OSCE relies on internal training materials and manuals as well as on external sources such as UNDPKO (particularly the UNCIVPOL Handbook and Training Curriculum), the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United States Institute for Peace, ICRC, IOM and UNHCR.

These subjects and topics are comparable to those developed by the EU Training Group, consisting of the focal points running the EU project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (Training of Civilian Experts for International Peace Missions). These

institutions are also OSCE partners and they prepare the EU secondees to OSCE operations.

### *The example of Germany*

There is clearly the need to systematically involving experts with non-governmental background in the wide range of civilian crisis management courses being offered in the Member States and lessons learnt from the more positive national experiences, such as Germany, could provide a valid starting base in this direction.

Forum ZFD in Germany is running two major training courses a year in Bonn (1 in German and 1 in English open also to foreigners). 80% of the civil society experts posted in the field have attended these courses. Training is funded by the German Govt (BMZ) for 90% and the balance is paid by the participants. Training includes various models of Conflict Transformation, Conflict Management etc, lasts about 4 months and targets 12-16 people each.

Training of civil peace workers is generally well developed in Germany, particularly at DED. Comparing it with training imparted by ZFD it is not very long (3 months) but more focused and detailed in the sense that it is linked to actual recruitment and most of the time, if not always, the trainee knows already where he/she will be posted. The training is therefore country specific, includes all traditional development tools and techniques (PCM etc), in house organizational training, full language training and one month special training on conflict transformation. The training is based on the fact that assignments are for at least two years.

Forum ZFD confirms that at present the system and existing procedures allow only for the selection and training of volunteers to be engaged for long-term assignments (2-3 years) and that they cannot be mobilised quickly (the entire process may take 1 year before deployment). They are interested and confident that in future people could be engaged also for shorter assignments and deployable in 2-3 months.

Participants at ZFD-courses have comparatively much less experience than those attending ZIF or other government-run training courses

## **12.3 Missing link of training and recruitment**

While the increased emphasis on EU-supported training for civilian conflict related purposes are appreciated by most stakeholders interviewed it is also commonly acknowledged that the link between training and deployment in the present system is very weak. Member States have so far been reluctant to link training with deployment needs to be addressed.

All this creates frustration that professionals genuinely interested in participating in crisis management initiatives “invest” in training without knowing if and when deployment is realistic. On the other hand, it is estimated that over half of the participants in the EU funded training courses had no intention of ever being deployed on an EU civilian crisis management mission. The establishment of ECPC should reduce this problem if it is possible to strengthen the links between training and deployment.

In this crucial area, OSCE is trying to facilitate exchange of information at the national level but it is clear there is sometimes little dialogue between the various local actors involved. The general impression is that many valuable structures are available but little linkages and inadequate synergies between these actors are actually in place.

There is an increasing need to include in special training courses also **non-diplomats and civil society**, particularly for **Eastern Europe** where for example the OSCE has traditionally relied on government officials. On the whole, it is now recognized that Peace building (and related activities) is so complex and wide that there is the need to tap all kinds of fields and expertise which may be available in the society at large.

Overall, OSCE estimates that some 80% of the personnel mobilised in large missions are “free agents” who have worked with the UN System, International NGOs etc and not merely diplomats or bureaucrats as it was the case some 10 years ago.

Training and an active training agenda are an essential part of the work of Peaceworkers UK, and training offers are mainly targeting those individuals Peaceworkers UK “wants to put forward”. The experience here is rather different and training courses tend to be of a few days duration only. The longest course arranged has been for two weeks, but intensive weekend courses including what is called “assessment weekends” of 1½ days are very popular and efficient not the least for people already with seniority and experience.

## **12.4 Conclusions**

There is the need to establish closer links between all these training initiatives. It needs to be identified which additional areas and issues, if any, need to be developed and incorporated in the current training modules and further progress towards establishing minimum standards for training of civilian personnel in these areas. ECPC could play an important role in this regard. Under the umbrella of ECPC these training initiatives could be linked and coordinated better. EU funding should be made available to further develop training models and to closer integrate the participating organisations.

The existing pilot project for EU Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management should be the starting point and basis for this approach. Ideally some of the participants become also focal points for recruitment so that it is easy to make the link between training and recruitment. This link is important to raise efficiency on both sides, in training and in recruiting.

## 13. ECPC in the African context

### 13.1 African initiatives

A new awareness about conflict response is growing among the international and regional organisations in Africa. Interviewees discussed the need for working on the root causes for conflict, including with peace building, while also reporting a serious lack of capacity.

Several initiatives related to civilian conflict capacity are under development in the African region, especially around the Horn of Africa and in the Great Lakes Region. The initiatives have either a continental or a regional scope. The **African Union's** effort to create an African volunteer programme is the continental initiative. Regionally, the East African **Inter-Governmental Authority on Development** (IGAD's conflict prevention strategy) is also a strong initiative. Some of the African programmes focus on local conflicts, such as the need to promote "a culture of peace" in areas where local armed nomadic/pastoralists or clan conflicts are common.

Yet, even the African Union illustrates the big gap between the ambitions and the existing capacity. The AU is a small institution with small resources compared to the African challenges. A political compromise has secured the administrative budget of AU, because the five biggest members each has promised to pay 15 %. The AU solidarity budget, however, with a USD63m formal budget has received only symbolic contributions from the member countries.

### 13.2 Cooperation between African organisations and ECPC

The organisations interviewed were positive about cooperation with ECPC. Three main points emerged during the consultations:

- Need for African capacity building
- Desire to strengthen African-European co-operation
- Ensure joint deployment to avoid invoking images of colonisation

The Darfur situation in Sudan may serve as an example showing how limited the local and national capacity is and how difficult it is, also for African organisations, to work in very sensitive political areas.

In order to document the potential for cooperation, the conclusions from the organisations are here listed in a descriptive format:

The director for Peace and Security at the **AU Commission** and the head of the **AU Conflict Management Centre** both stressed the need to strengthen local capacities and African institutions as part of a wider security framework for Africa. In particular, ownership, local capacity and strengthened African institutions are fundamental prerequisites for ECPC partnerships. In the view of our interlocutors, an ECPC deployment should not just consist of Europeans but be based on close cooperation with Africans, including provision of adequate employment and deployment of qualified Africans.

During 2005 the AU has carried out expensive recruitment for activities in Sudan. This is one area where the organisation could benefit from ECPC assistance. The ECPC could possibly also support the AU in establishing a voluntary corps, which is currently under consideration.

Meanwhile, the head of the Conflict Management Centre noted that, “if the right Africans are not involved, ECPC will look as if Europe is trying to colonise Africa once again.”

Representatives from **InterAfricaGroup**, from the **Regional Nairobi Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons** and from **Africa Peace Forums** did all see possibilities for a strengthening of local initiatives through ECPC. The ECPC idea fits with UN-reform proposals on strengthening preventive activities.

The Chairman of InterAfricaGroup in Addis Ababa proposed to base ECPC on a mix of European and national/local professionals. In relation to Africa, he proposed that ECPC should be open both for Africans with relevant experiences from other African countries and regions and for Africans from the European Diaspora, thereby limiting the risk that EU is criticized for interference in African affairs. Activities could thus contribute to strengthen human constituencies and links between Europe and Africa. A joint initiative between EU and AU could give AU more relevance.

The Nairobi Secretariat for Light Weapons in the same way stressed that ECPC-professionals in mixed African European teams can contribute to supporting the important local institutions. The secretariats director sees a possible need for assistance in the monitoring of local activities and in contributing to a culture of peace. According to the Nairobi protocol the programme has as an important objective to “promote culture of peace and involve and cooperate with all sectors of society”. The regional secretariat primarily plays a role in relation to local conflicts, e.g., between pastoralists and about scarce water resources.

AfricaPeaceForum (APFO) in Nairobi has been involved in conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution in East Africa and in the Great Lakes Region. Leading members are former diplomats. According to APFO there is no alternative to working with civil society organisations and with Africans on the ground in a country, but local organisations do often lack the necessary means. ECPC may be useful in this context if ECPC can supplement rather than compete or replace local institutions. APFO-representatives however also stressed the strong need for well defined roles, including clear relations to national and international organisations in an area.

African capacity problems are also highlighted in the 2005-report from the British initiated **Commission for Africa**, which speaks about the need to promote ‘African solutions’ in the area of peace and security, and states that “the African organisations face considerable constraints in terms of infrastructure and financial and human resources to act effectively”, and that “there is evidence that greater investment in non-military tools for intervention would yield considerable benefits in strengthening the ability of all these organisations to prevent and resolve violent conflict effectively – and reduce the demand for peacekeeping in the longer-term”.

According to the Commission for Africa both the AU and regional African organisations at present have to ask for new funds from international donors each time they need funds for operations, and this means that they spend precious time with donor initiatives. The Commission for Africa therefore recommends to donors to fund at least 50 % of the AU’s Peace Fund from 2005 onwards. It is at the same time stressed that the most effective contribution by “external actors’ to post-conflict peace building is when they are “in support of local processes, and are sensitive to the context.”

These observations and recommendations from the Commission for Africa are confirmed by interviews with African stakeholders.

### **13.4 Donor programmes**

A number of Northern donors are supporting AU through paying for consultants and advisors. Major donors for this type of funding include **EU**, **UNDP** and **Canada**. The new Danish 'Africa Programme for Peace' includes support for **ECOWAS** and IGAD. All involved, however, are emphasizing the need for strengthening of the African actors. The best people in AU and other relevant African institutions are extremely busy.

Africans from the European Diaspora have turned out to be relevant and successful as advisors not least in regional organisations, e.g., ECOWAS. They do often have good African networks and have a special background for supporting capacity development through African institutions, e.g., in West Africa through cooperation with **West African Civil Society Forum** WACSOFF.

Denmark's '**Africa Programme for Peace**' plans support for 'operational conflict prevention' and it is stated in the programme that "Conflict prevention – as crisis management – should be made operational by developing a single conflict prevention doctrine and standard operating procedures (including a "database" over possible types of missions/interventions, generic guidelines for missions and rules for mission administration) by acquiring and readying the necessary equipment (logistics of conflict prevention), by establishing a roster of conflict prevention experts/observers in various fields as well as preparing/training them (generally creating the 'standby force of conflict prevention') and by securing immediate access to funds."

Under the heading "Civil Society", the programme is mentioning the following operational action measures: Early warning, political agenda setting, capacity building and mediation in localized conflicts, harnessing the forces for peace, enhancing the protection of vulnerable groups such as women and children."

### **13.5 Current demands in Sudan**

Darfur in Sudan is considered a real conflict-situation which (in August 2005) may make it difficult or impossible possibly to deploy ECPC due to security risks. Southern Sudan, however, is now in a post-conflict situation and is mentioned by many as an area where ECPC in principle could work and contribute with added value to the peace process. This study thus reviewed the Sudan case as an example for potential ECPC engagement.

In April 2005, the Sudanese Civil Society Forum brought together more than seventy representatives from the Sudanese civil society and representatives from international non-governmental organisations working in Sudan. They met in Oslo, and produced a statement with 11 recommendations "for a real sustainable and lasting peace in Sudan."

The recommendations speak about the need for the necessary consultative processes to overhaul the legal system and the need for inclusive consultations also with the civil society in constitution and decision making-processes.

Many of the recommendations are fully in line with the ideas behind ECPC. The following clearly demonstrate a need for an ECPC-type engagement:

*Recommendation no 4:*

Technical and professional training and institutional development support for civil society organizations to enable them to assume their full role in rebuilding the Sudan.

*Recommendation no 6:*



Immediate transformation from military to civilian rule. This should happen through open and transparent mechanisms that are consultative with civil society and community groups.

*Recommendation no 7:*

Immediate support for a nation-wide emergence of a culture of peace, justice, truth and reconciliation. This can be done through the establishment of truth and reconciliation processes, tribunals, and institutional Ombudsman among others. Civil society must have a strong voice in determining what type of justice and reconciliation process is adopted and in implementation. Accountability and impunity must also be addressed in the face of crimes against humanity, rape, ethnic cleansing, torture and other human rights abuses.

*Recommendation no 8:*

The on-going efforts of civil society and faith-based organizations and groups towards peace and development must be fully supported. Post-conflict reconstruction must be comprehensive and include all groups including the Diaspora. Civic education, literacy and awareness-raising are important components for peace-building. A national commission must be set up for reforming the education system and curriculum, and civil society must be involved.

These four and several other recommendations stress the need for active support to the strengthening of local civil society organisations as one of the most important means to make the peace sustainable.

## **13.6 Conclusions**

The conclusion from discussions with international European and African representatives is that there is an interest for the establishment of ECPC, and that ECPC can contribute to the strengthening of local activities in relation to conflict prevention and peace building. A number of important conditions however have to be fulfilled:

- ECPC-activities need to be based on a very clear mandate and on close coordination with other international organisations with respect for their mandates and with well defined roles for ECPC-activities.
- ECPC-deployment need in many cases to be supplemented with financial support with the aim of strengthening local organisations and institutions and their capacity for dealing with pre- and post-conflict situation based on local responsibility and ownership.
- ECPC should not solely be a European team of professionals. It is important to work with integrated teams in Africa, including African professionals with relevant and possibly more direct experiences from conflict. Integrated teams will in a number of cases be based on EU funding also of non-European members. In some cases It may be relevant to use non-European professionals living in the European Diaspora in ECPC.

## **14. European NGO-views on ECPC**

European NGOs cover the full spectrum of attitudes towards the proposed ECPC. Some are sceptical, some are positive, and many have adopted a wait-and-see attitude saving judgment for more information on ECPC.

The broad range of responses raises some concerns. The support of national NGOs is necessary to gather and manage a database of volunteers. It is also important to be welcomed in the field where NGOs and international organisations are already active.

### **14.1 Positive attitudes**

Organisations working directly with peace education and conflict management are generally positive toward the proposed ECPC. They note that European initiatives and overall publicity on the strengthening of EU instruments for civilian crisis related activities can contribute to the mobilisation of more interested professionals. Positive statements include:

- There is a need to work much more with the civilian aspects of crisis and conflict management, and the development of ECPC will benefit from increased public awareness and an already higher level of activity in national organisations working with peace education, peace building and conflict management.
- European funding of ECPC can bring activities around conflict prevention and peace building more in to the main stream of thinking and thereby also contribute to the strengthening of already existing civil society-initiatives.
- More and better funding (for ECPC) may make it possible to attract more and also more qualified professional experienced people for a different civilian peace- and conflict prevention-related missions.
- While it is essential to have local and national and regional involvement and ownership in conflict management and prevention activities, Europeans with the right background can sometimes stimulate and support important local processes in pre and post conflict situations. ECPC could have important catalyst roles.
- There is a need for EU visibility with civilian experts in areas of tension. A Polish representative mentioned that during the tensions and change of regime in Ukraine, observers were present from many European countries, but not at a formal EU-level.
- NGO and Civil society involvement in recruitment for ECPC could include financial benefits for NGO's.

### **14.2 Sceptical attitudes**

The reservations come primarily from organisations working with humanitarian emergency assistance. They are concerned that the entry of ECPC onto this market will create bottlenecks when recruiting personnel. Limited by their current remuneration principles, NGOs are already facing problems recruiting qualified personnel. ECPC may exaggerate these problems. Sceptical statements include:

- Some NGOs are already experiencing difficulties in finding a sufficient number of qualified professionals. There is a felt risk, that ECPC will erode NGO's possibilities for attracting the right people. There is also a fear that ECPC will pay better than national NGO's and thereby make life more difficult for the NGO's. In the new member countries there is already a certain feeling of stress in relation to international demands for personnel. More databases will not automatically provide more qualified persons.

- It will be difficult to distinguish between the different conflict phases: From the threat of conflict through conflict, post conflict, rehabilitation and development, and there is a great risk of duplicated efforts and overlapping. The already existing problems with too many uncoordinated donors and stakeholders in times of conflict and emergency may increase further.
- There is already a lack of coordination between different wings of the EU, such as ECHO, Relex and the Civil protection instruments. There is a risk that more instruments can complicate the situation further.
- There could be a problem with mandates and roles of different international organisations such as UN, OSCE and EU. ECPC could be seen as an EU effort to try to get a wider mandate and reducing the mandate of others?
- Many questions have been asked about the demand- and management structure. Who should request ECPC, how are ECPC-missions to be prepared, and how will the working- and management structure be?

In spite of scepticism and practical reservations many express an interested positive attitude. They consider the ECPC-idea interesting. They are ready to elaborate further on ECPC-possibilities. They see the concept of ECPC as having a positive potential if the problems creating scepticism can be solved.

## **15. Conclusions and Recommendations**

### **15.1 General conclusions**

#### *The idea of ECPC*

The proposal to create ECPC was introduced at a time when the EU had not yet developed instruments for conflict prevention and crisis management. Today the original proposal and the most recent ECPC-resolution from the Parliament has to be seen in the light of the international development since then, both in the crisis environment and with the new instruments available. Some of the existing EU- instruments may render some the original aims for ECPC superfluous, while other instruments, such as the Rapid Reaction Mechanism may make it easier to finance ECPC actions at short notice.

The EU has a number of tools for assistance in civilian crisis management available. The EU and the Member States are together one of the largest providers of grant assistance in the world, and a number of newer instruments make it possible through EU-assistance to support political and diplomatic initiatives to defuse crisis and to provide incentives to the parties to resolve disputes. Other instruments deal, among others, with the safeguarding of human rights and democratic processes, and a number of specialised sectoral instruments are particularly suited to provide emergency support in politically unstable environments where needs are rapidly changing.

The proposal for and concept of a European Civil Peace Corps (ECPC) has to be seen in this perspective and as part of the further development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

It is a general conclusion of this feasibility study that the core idea of the proposal for ECPC is not covered by any of the existing EU instruments. The original proposal was broader in its scope and included the use of ECPC for humanitarian aid and reconstruction measures, whereas the ECPC's objectives in this study are focused only on pre- and post-conflict activities, excluding humanitarian aid and classical development assistance. The study of the needs and potential demands has also shown that the nature of ECPC-personnel, should not be inexperienced volunteers but mission-specific professionals many of which with considerable field-experience. Interviews and consultations indicate that there is a need and will be a demand for such ECPC-personnel in pre-and post conflict situations in third countries if it is possible to secure a sufficiently clear mandate backed by the UN or regional organisations and provided it is possible to establish clear operational structures

The background for the first ECPC-proposal was the international community's failure in relation to the conflicts in the Balkans. Though it was obvious that serious conflicts were under development the right civilian instruments to prevent war did not exist, and the situation went from conflict to open war.

The idea behind ECPC was to give civilian professionals a role which could contribute to preventing that already existing crisis become violent and thereby making it possible to work more efficient and coordinated to prevent the need for military action. The aim was to develop a flexible instrument at a time when EU had no conflict prevention and crisis management unit and no Rapid Reaction Mechanism. It was also the idea to involve the NGO's in the European civil society because many existing EU mechanisms have more focus on the public sectors.

This study shows that the thinking behind ECPC is still valid, and the new instruments within EU can in different ways assist the development of a flexible-ECPC-instrument. The

establishment of ECPC will also benefit an ongoing positive development in which peace- and conflict related Civil Society activities are presently gaining strength in several EU Member States.

#### *The mandate*

The European Parliament ECPC-proposal (Version: 28. January 1999 A4-0047/99) stresses that the ECPC will function only under a mandate backed by the UN or its regional organisations: OSCE, OAU or OAS.

It goes beyond the scope of the ToR of this study to describe the demand- and management structure for ECPC, but discussions with international organisations (UN, OSCE, ODIHR and AU) clearly show the importance of a clear operational ECPC-structure based on coordination and agreement with the relevant regional and local organisations. OSCE clearly sees pre- and post conflict issues in Europe as being part of the OSCE-mandate, and the African Union considers it as one of AU's main objectives to strengthen its own capacity to manage pre-and post conflict situations through own resources.

Resources deriving from ECPC may be welcomed but under the condition that they be utilised for capacity building and the strengthening of local civilian organisations and at the same time also make it possible to mobilise more local and regional professionals.

## **15.2 Specific conclusions and recommendations**

### *Name, size and scope*

The term “**Peace Corps**” in relation to ECPC is misleading. It not only indicates a similarity to the US Peace Corps, which is sending relatively young volunteers in development contexts. It is also not the right term for a EU instrument that provides qualified and specialised experts for world wide crisis management interventions.

The deployment of ECPC-personnel should be based on a thorough assessment of the country- and conflict- specific needs and candidates should be selected on the basis of their specific relevant professional qualifications. ECPC-assistance should therefore be based on small integrated teams and should not be a large corps of volunteers.

### Recommendations:

- ⇒ ECPC should be started as a pilot project with limited scope.
- ⇒ Initially the European ECPC-pool should not contain more than a few hundred European candidates spread across Europe and across domains of expertise.
- ⇒ If recruitment and deployment – as recommended – is based on national rosters and pre selection of candidates, a small management team should be responsible for final selection and cooperation with relevant organisation(s) within a partnership framework.
- ⇒ ECPC should create stronger links between the civil society and the EU in support for activities related to civilian crisis management, conflict prevention and post conflict peace building
- ⇒ It is recommended that the ECPC should, initially at least, be dedicated to a narrow range of conflict-related activities. These should include in particular:
  - Monitoring of human rights in conflict zones. This should include the rights of women, the situation of children at risk of forced enrolment, and the situation

of refugees and internally displaced people. The monitoring should, wherever possible, feed into relevant UN mechanisms.

- Local mediation. This should include work at grassroots level with local authorities, traditional elders, women's groups, religious leaders, etc, to contribute to the establishment and restoration of dialogue over local concerns, including the fight against poverty and social exclusion. This may also include activities against discrimination.
- Capacity-building for conflict prevention and transformation. This could include training and other awareness-raising activities in relation to human rights, conflict, law, access to justice, etc. The objective would be to ensure that communities involved in a conflict enhance internal dynamics conducive to the prevention and transformation of conflict.

### *The supply structure*

The European landscape offers a high potential for recruitment of civilians for crisis response. In some of the Member States specialised organisations already maintain well managed systems and rosters to recruit civilian experts for OSCE, UN and NGO missions in conflict prevention and crisis management.

The advantages of a **decentralized system** outweigh the constraints given by the fact that there is no common or uniform European model for national registration and/or recruitment of volunteers and professionals for international short and long term missions. A decentralised recruitment structure based on national rosters and ECPC-publicity will support the efforts to **mobilise additional qualified professional human resources** for conflict related interventions. This is a stated objective and it can reduce the risk expressed by some European NGO's that ECPC will increase the competition for scarce qualified personnel.

### Recommendations:

- ⇒ Recruitment for ECPC should be based on decentralised national and/or regional recruitment systems.
- ⇒ The ECPC-system should be based on the establishment of a small efficient unit within the Commission.
- ⇒ ECPC should be based on a kind of framework partnership agreement with relevant European NGOs or state agencies selected on the basis of their qualifications and capacity as well for identification and selection of projects as for managing ECPC-programmes.

If it is decided to test ECPC through a pilot phase or a more gradual development to gain experience it will – in spite of differences between member countries – be possible to use existing structures in the Member States to identify candidates and to make a pre-screening. It will open the possibility to establish more permanent national or regional focal points in a gradual process.

Databases and rosters with potential professional candidates for ECPC are much more developed in some European countries and organisations than in others. In a pilot phase it will be possible to base recruitment on a limited number of rosters, and the most developed registers may recruit from more than one Member State. The most developed of the relevant registers seem to be at the moment the Peaceworkers Register in the UK and the ZIF roster in Germany.

### Recommendation:

- ⇒ ECPC should be started in a pilot phase. During the pilot phase the Commission should establish a network of focal points in European countries with a limited number of organisations in Member States.

Qualification and readiness to leave are the two key **criteria for the targeting** of potential volunteers. ECPC will have to compete with other recruiting organisations as the pool of qualified and available experts in civilian crisis management is limited. To have access to qualified experts the ECPC structure must include or have access to recruitment specialists with a good knowledge of the sector.

Recommendations:

- ⇒ The ECPC structure must include or have access to recruitment specialists with a good knowledge of the sector.
- ⇒ Any recruitment body must be present on a national (meaning local) level and must have knowledge about the local recruitment markets.
- ⇒ Nationality requirements for volunteers should not prevent citizens of the countries or regions where it is deployed from joining the ECPC.

IT based solutions open wide possibilities for the management of a roster for experts. However an **active roster management** and a good knowledge of the area and the candidates are essential to assure quality and effectiveness in recruiting.

Recommendations:

- ⇒ Any roster must be actively managed with regular contacts to candidates and good knowledge about their profiles and experiences.
- ⇒ The roster management should be linked to training.
- ⇒ Recruitment experts should have a strong interest in and should promote the development of the candidates' profiles.
- ⇒ The exchange of registered candidates should be facilitated and encouraged to create a "common EU spirit", to benefit from each others experiences, and to bind candidates to the EU roster
- ⇒ The example of present and past rosters managed by the Commission should be analysed carefully to learn from previous experiences.

**Benefits and entitlements** are important factors already for the recruiting process. They are not only for the recruiting and sending organisation important. Also for the expert the composition of benefits are crucial factors for the attractiveness of an organisation.

Recommendations:

- ⇒ Benefits and entitlements should be "competitive" to similar recruitment schemes to get access to qualified experts.
- ⇒ Benefits and entitlements should be granted with respect to the expected qualification and specialisation of experts and should reflect the nature and character of the expected tasks.

### *The deployment structure*

ECPC-activities in third countries have to take place in a well defined structure based on clear operational guidelines and with delimitation from traditional humanitarian assistance and development activities. The management structure and level of coordination with other local and international stakeholders need also to be defined on a specific basis taking the

actual pre or post conflict situation into account. **Mission support** is crucial for the successful deployment of volunteers.

The question of mission support goes in line with the need to work with **local structures** and to seek **local ownership**. The integration of local resources into the operations will contribute to the sustainability of activities. In many cases the most relevant intervention may be based on integrated teams where ECPC-professionals work together with local volunteers, possibly with financial support from the EU to finance local volunteers and professionals.

Recommendations:

- ⇒ An efficient locally based structure needs to be in place including well informed and proper equipped staff.
- ⇒ The role of the EU Delegations needs to be clearly defined in this regard.
- ⇒ ECPC should work in integrated teams comprising international and local experts.
- ⇒ Not only for recruitment but also for the deployment of experts ECPC could work through a kind of FPA with European civil society organisations.
- ⇒ ECPC should be closely linked with a funding mechanism which can fund local capacity building and local and national peace related civil society institutions working with related initiatives.
- ⇒ If the ECPC is to maintain neutrality, and to be seen to be neutral, it should remain as distant as reasonably feasible from the diplomatic activities conducted by EU Delegations and other EU organs in relation to the conflict. This should generally mean that ECPC volunteers should not be involved in the formulation and implementation of national-level diplomatic and political activities.

### *Training*

There is the need to establish **closer links** between all existing training initiatives. It needs to be identified which additional areas and issues -if any- need to be developed and incorporated in the current training modules and further progress towards establishing **minimum standards** for training of civilian personnel in these areas. ECPC could play an important role in this regard. Under the umbrella of ECPC existing training initiatives could be linked and coordinated better.

Recommendations:

- ⇒ Existing training initiatives (EU and non-EU initiatives) should be developed further and linked to ECPC.
- ⇒ EU funding should be made available to further develop training models and to closer integrate the participating organisations.
- ⇒ The existing pilot project for EU Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management should be the starting point and basis for this approach. Ideally some of the participants become also focal points for recruitment so that it is easy to make the link between training and recruitment.
- ⇒ Training for ECPC experts should cover, as appropriate, the main area(s) of the ECPC mandate in which each volunteer is expected to work, but should also cover the other ideas, albeit in less detail. Training should also cover standard items such as EU procedures, the EU's CFSP, as well as organisational issues.



*Continuing discussion process and public consultation*

The complexity of the issues raised in the present feasibility study, the large number of potential stakeholders and the range of other activities with which overlaps are possible suggest that a full public consultation is the only procedure conducive to a full and informed debate about the establishment of an ECPC.

⇒ It is recommended that the Commission should develop and produce a White Paper on the establishment of an ECPC, which should include the following elements:

- An overview of the missions and tasks of the ECPC;
- An overview of the main public sector- and NGO-led initiatives across the EU in fields covered by the ECPC;
- Options for the management mechanism of the ECPC;
- An overview of the relationship between the ECPC and existing European and international mechanisms related to conflict management;

The present study may provide some of the information needed as a basis for such a paper. The consultation process on such a White Paper should include its discussion at national level, involving civil society organisations, and should conclude with a conference involving participants from civil society as well as from the main EU institutions with a stake in the ECPC.

—